Grand Strategy and the U.S. Election

by John Thompson

03/15/04

Military officers have a saying: "Amateurs talk about strategy, dilettantes talk about tactics, and professionals talk about logistics." After thirteen years in the Canadian Army and twenty years talking about security and military issues, I know this is quite true.

Jean Chretien’s proposed UN mission to the Eastern Congo back in the mid-1990s provided one example of the differences between amateurs, dilettantes and professionals. After the UN bungled the mission in Rwanda (by not letting the seasoned soldiers on the ground off the leash to prevent the massacre of 800,000 people), millions of Hutus fled the outraged Tutsis and went into eastern Zaire. These refugees had to live in appalling circumstances, and were surrounded by many tribal enemies in an area where no law ruled — this helped trigger the ongoing war in the region that has cost about a million deaths a year since.

Many of the Hutu refugees are now dead — disease, starvation or violence claimed most of them, but for a brief while the TV news crews of the world were paying some attention to their plight. Chretien caught one broadcast about the misery of the situation and immediately decided that nothing would do but a humanitarian intervention (e.g. aid-giving backed up by military force), a mission which Canada could lead.

After his amateurish decision, the dilettantes of our Department of External Affairs and politicized officers of National Defence Headquarters started to discuss the means by which this decision could be implemented within a UN framework. It took the more professional officers of NDHQ (and in other militaries who received Canada’s invitation to join in) to pour cold water in the entire situation.

The military professionals pointed out that, despite the obvious humanitarian benefits of such a mission, with no railroads, paved highways, seaports, or even modern airports within 1,000 km of the region, there was no way either adequate relief supplies or a military force to ensure their delivery could get there. Great idea, couldn’t be done.

Where trifling details like logistics do not get in the way, it is easy for anyone to formulate a grand strategy — which is why politicians and other amateurs get involved in it all the time. While, as in all things, the devil is in the details, there are a couple of other simple military truths (taught to all young officers and learned the hard way by most NCOs) that politicians should remember.

While it is easy to create a grand strategy to deal with a problem, the important thing is to stick to it. Changing a strategy is worse than not having one at all, because every time the direction changes — all the time, money and effort invested in the previous approach is wasted. The second point is even more important: Remember what the aim was in the first place. Activities are not as important in themselves as are the goals these activities are meant to reach. There are hundreds of historical examples (in almost all spheres of human activity) to learn from, but modern decision makers seldom read much history anyway.

After finally being confronted with the enormity of the threat from radical Islam, President George W. Bush conceived of a grand strategy to help prevent more attacks like those of 9-11. This was a two tier approach — first to help the passive defences of US (and allied societies) with a massive shakeup in domestic intelligence gathering and security preparations. Secondly, if the Islamic world was generating ideological terrorism, then it would be time to nudge that world into growing in a different direction.

Like all grand strategies, the overall plan is simple but the devils in the details are particularly vexing. The creation of a Department of Homeland Security is causing the greatest reorganization of American government since the Second World War; meaning that it is expensive and a long way from being fully effective. Also, defensive measures are passive, and can never guarantee full protection.

The liberations of Afghanistan and Iraq were also daring policy decisions and necessary — but neither country is likely to become a prosperous civil society anytime soon. US hopes that these transformations might eventually change the entire Arab world for the better may be wishful thinking, but the alternatives would be much worse. Ideologies either have to be seen to be less competitive in providing for people’s wants, or else they have to be bloodily hammered into extinction. The first approach worked to end the Cold War, the second was necessary to get rid of Nazism.

Both grand strategies have been undertaken and have been well advanced so far; but America’s weakness in grand strategy is that its leadership changes so frequently. Bush’s likeliest Democratic rival has sworn to weaken the defensive strategy and abandon the second one altogether. If this happens, the cost in human life will go from the thousands and into the tens (or hundreds) of millions. America’s voters should think very carefully in the coming months.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca