The strategic dilemmas of Bush and Bin Laden

by John Thompson

02/02/04

In the coming weeks, we will all know if the "Cave of Darkness" threat was made good in a massive incident in the US, and a series of accompanying small operations elsewhere. It may be that heightened security deterred the operation and it may be attempted later, or might even emerge that al Qaeda was simply bluffing.

Regardless, as the fourth year of the American War on Terrorism begins, and as al Qaeda enters its second decade of its ‘war’ on the Western world, 2004 will be a pivotal year for both President Bush and Osama Bin Laden.

While the threat posed by al Qaeda is real enough, this is an election year and George Bush’s administration faces the trial by electorate that all American politicians must face. Does he still have the confidence of the American people? We will know in November. Although the initial signs look positive, ten months is time enough for disasters and triumphs alike to be conceived and brought to term.

A change in government can always lead to a major change in the priority, or the very policy, of the war on terrorism and — if the year goes by without a 9-11 sized incident (or worse) — then Bush will face the dreadful equation that all authorities do in countering terrorism: Success = complacency = vulnerability.

This equation, particularly this year leads to a damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don’t quandary. Continued alerts, useful as they may be, are becoming both expensive and unpopular. Calling them wins no favors, particularly as the continued absence of a major attack convinces more and more people that the danger has ebbed away. But, if an attack succeeds in repeating the death toll and economic damage wrought by the 911 outrage, then immense criticism will rain down on Bush’s head for everything he did, everything he failed to do and anything that was done insufficiently.

Lurking in his hideaway (wherever it actually is), Bin Laden has a similar problem. Every attempt to launch a major outrage inside the Western World since 9-11 has failed; usually because of the arrest of key personnel or because of heightened security in Western Europe and North America. They have launched some very significant attacks (notably in Bali and Kenya), his tens of millions of admirers and supporters in the Arab World are starting to ask "Where’s the grief? 911 was very fine, but what have you done to the Crusaders and Jews lately?"

If Al Qaeda is to keep its place, they need to score another enormous success. Otherwise, they might dwindle into a more ordinary terrorist network and see some of the sixty component groups in their alliance branch off on their own.

Bin Laden, no more than Bush, can afford failure either. One of the reasons why al Qaeda’s attack profile is so muted is that a spectacular error (like the arrest of all its agents before an assault begins) would strip away too much of the aura of infallibility and mystery that their prestige rests on. A more aggressive attitude — attempting more actions in the West and giving more autonomy to their component cells — might succeed, but might also give more intelligence (and targets) for Western counteractions.

There might be some grounds to believe that al Qaeda is considering a switch in priorities — in pushing towards its second main objective of toppling Arab governments before it first terrorizes the West into withdrawing from the Muslim world. The risk here is that there might be increased cooperation with the Americans from endangered governments and the polarization of opinion within the Islamic world for and against al Qaeda — although a similar effect was sought by many Marxist terrorist groups in the 1970s and ‘80s.

In the last two and a half years, increased American/Western involvement in the Muslim world has increased enormously, and for al Qaeda there is always a risk (remote as it may seem) that the American experiments in Iraq and Afghanistan may become influential examples of democratic government in the Islamic Arab world. Additionally, popular discontent with the Iranian theocracy is growing and there is a race underway for the hearts and minds of a growing number of discontented Saudis too.

In sum, time is al Qaeda’s enemy, forcing actions that, if unsuccessful, could seriously increase its status and prestige. While inactivity would enhance American vulnerability, it would also sap their strength. However, for Bush, a quiet al Qaeda would undermine American security efforts and erode popular support for them, but a successful attack inside the United States might also expose him to a storm of criticism in an election year.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca