Derek Nelson has outlined (probably most accurately) where Saudi Arabia will go in the current Jihadist War. It shall tighten up on Al Qaeda domestically and rein in — somewhat — the Wahhabi doctrines only so far as they threaten Saudi Arabia’s domestic tranquillity. However, they will still remain as a net supporter of the Jihadist cause when pursued outside of the Kingdom. In other words, they are going to remain more of a liability than an asset — if the Royal family has its usual way.

However, warfare is a dynamic process, and al Qaeda does have its own strategies and objectives. There is the ancient military axiom (whose accuracy has been proven time and time again), that no plan can survive contact with the enemy. Al Qaeda and the Jihadists have their own objectives and the revolutionary passions they have fanned can have a life of their own. It is often impossible to control a wildfire, and it is equally difficult to control an ideology once it is formulated and the legions of the angry and ambitious take it for themselves. Saudi money and backing set the Wahabbi’s loose in the world, and the Princes are deceiving themselves if they think they can control it now.

Al Qaeda and the Jihadists seek to weaken the Western World. They also want to expel all Westerners and non-Muslims from the Middle East, and to topple all Middle Eastern governments that are not Jihadist in orientation.

Instability in the Arab World generally, and in Saudi Arabia itself, is real and growing. For the Saudis, the annual share of oil wealth in proportion to the population is shrinking. The rapidly growing population yields more young men with no real prospects and a dislike for their national elites. Additionally, one should remember three aspects of any insurgent movement:

1. Leaders and followers alike seek to accomplish great things, to storm the gates of heaven and pull down the high towers. Following a mild course of balanced political nuances is most unlikely.
2. Insurgents invariably seek to polarize a targeted society (Arabs and Muslims in this case), and to give people no choice but to side with the heroic wonderful cause promised by the terrorists, or to band alongside the despised authorities.
3. Modern terrorist groups (and this is especially true for al Qaeda) are deliberately organized into a broad network of quasi-autonomous components. Even if — and this is big ‘if’ — Al Qaeda would wish to preserve a status quo of sorts with the House of Saud, there is no guarantee that the whole network would follow.

Al Qaeda and the Jihadists will want to continue attacks on foreigners in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries. These attacks, ghastly as they have been, are minor so far when considering the immense numbers of non-Arabs working in the region. But they could become much worse.

If attacks continue, they will place a strain on insurance premiums, salaries, and the willingness of countries and corporations to work there. Security costs will also increase. These will all have a pronounced effect on the price of oil and on the ability of the oil industry to work efficiently.

It has happened in the past that the atrocities of insurgents have forced an action-reaction cycle that can drive events toward a breaking point. Here, instability will cause more unrest, more attacks on foreigners, more security costs (with no guarantee of efficiency) and higher oil prices without an accompanying increase in the largess of Arab oil-rich governments to their citizens -- which leads to more unrest. With a few really spectacular attacks, the whole action-reaction cycle could kick into overdrive and take on a life of its own.

Two other considerations: Saudi Arabia cannot really trust all of its security forces, and Al Qaeda has shown that they can imitate Saudi police and military to deliver attacks on foreigners. As ever, the terrorists’ aptitude to undermine popular confidence in the ability of the authorities to protect society will yield even more dividends. Secondly, Saudi Arabia cannot run itself without a large number of foreigners there. They constitute much of the labour force, and virtually all of the technical and middle management roles that keep the Kingdom running.

So what could happen? Hopefully, Saudi Arabia could turn out to be ruthless enough to quell Al Qaeda and its supporters within its territory (and we will end up turning even more of a blind eye to its human rights abuses than we have in the past). If not, then many truly bad outcomes may ensue.

Even if Saudi Arabia doesn’t destabilize, oil prices will continue to rise around the world, with predictable economic effects. Also, the attacks on foreigners need not be restricted to Saudi Arabia — as the petulant Bathists and infuriated Jihadists in Iraq have already amply proven. The tactic is a handy one and might soon be seen elsewhere in the smaller oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf. This will also have a powerful influence on global oil prices.

If Saudi Arabia does end up sliding over the edge into acute instability, the whole world will enter more dangerous territory. Because of the contemporary ’progressive’ contempt for economics and big business, we forget that commerce is the heartbeat of civilization itself. Oil, particularly inexpensive and reliable oil, is vital for the entire planet.

One important aspect of Gulf Arab oil rests with their subsidies to other Islamic or Arab nations. Syria and Egypt depend on these subsidies and a large reduction or loss in revenues would be catastrophic; substantially increasing their own vulnerability to instability.

If Saudi Arabia descends into anarchy or collapse, an intervention might not only be necessary, it may be unavoidable. Such an intervention would be the ultimate ‘outrage’ to Jihadists (as if we should be careful of injuring their feelings), but if Non-Muslims occupy the very heartland of Islam the effect would be incendiary. The polarization effect sought by the terrorists anyway might be rapidly achieved among the Saudi population and throughout the entire Islamic World — a world that now includes substantial communities of Muslims residing within the Western World.

Every non-Islamic government in the Muslim world will also be catapulted into an absolute battle for its own survival. These governments will perforce become our ‘Allies’, but will survive only through savage repression. We held our collective noses about some of our Allies in the Second World War and the Cold War, we can do it again if necessary but it would weaken our usual claim to be fighting for higher purposes. Moreover, we might be able to spare no resources to assist them, which means many such governments would topple and vast areas of the Islamic world would come under Fundamentalist control.

The conflict that would follow a Saudi collapse would be a much wider and bloodier conflagration than many of us dare contemplate now. The conflict would generate refugees far beyond the world’s capacity to absorb them (particularly as the Western world would be extremely reluctant to receive any). The risk of the flagrant and widespread use of weapons of mass destruction would be much higher too. Al Qaeda has made no secret of its intentions in this regard; Pakistan’s nuclear program is notoriously infested with fundamentalists and Iran’s nuclear debut is fast approaching.

Yet perhaps Al Qaeda’s capabilities and appeal have been over-estimated. Perhaps Saudi Arabia’s government and society might be more robust than many of us currently believe it is. All our fears could be for naught. This would be lovely, if true. However, prudence always dictates that one should plan for the worst even while hoping for the best; and the worst could be foul indeed.

Human relations and the fundamentals of conflict are really not that complicated — despite the modern need for "policy" and over-rationalization to explain everything. Most of what one needs to know about relations between interests and nations can be observed in any schoolyard, as children start to assert themselves and find their limits.

It is in the schoolyard where one may find out about the bully within and learn to resist it. Hopefully, the schoolyard is also where one learns how to stand up against aggression by others, or learns to come to the aid of the weak. One of the most glorious things that can happen is seeing a bully suddenly confronted by his victims and overthrown.

It is possible that these vital lessons are not being learned in these ‘kinder’ and more ‘compassionate’ era — especially given the very close supervision school children receive when at play nowadays. Moreover, where the physical aspects of assertiveness and defence are repressed, non-physical bullying may become more intense; and that vital lesson to wannabe grade school elites that the hoi polloi will not always remain passive may also be missed.

One key lesson, which is valid from schoolyards to the massive struggles between coalitions of states, is best summed up by Karl von Clausewitz. He argued that violence is a form of expression and a means of communication.

Does this sound abstruse? The message delivered by violence can be quite simple; especially when turning on a bully, a sneak-thief or a petty vandal in the schoolyard and hitting him until he cries "Enough!" In short, one is punching in a lesson: "Have you had enough yet?"; "Are you going to stop now?", and, "Have you learned your lesson?"

The same dynamic is at work in war. In the end, all the grand strategy, rates of applied industrial production, the harnessed will of the people, the cunning generalship and the valor of the soldiers comes down to a single end. This single end is what Clausewitz described as the imposition of one’s will on the enemy. Whack! "Will you stop now?" Whack! "Give up yet?"

Some entities remain stubborn (There was the one would-be bully who consecutively lost fights with the author at age 13, both his younger brothers, and then went after his little sister… Soon after, he clearly learned that this last act was an especially bad idea). There are states that, despite all our wishful thinking about sanctions, stiff diplomatic notes and glowering editorials in our newspapers, hold out against all reason. Historically, only the fall of their capital cities persuaded some truculent malcontents to see the light of reason — though not even this worked on Hitler and Hussein. Totalitarians are always happy to ignore all pressure until their last army is broken. The will of a democratic people, once committed, can sometimes also be hard to break.

Other entities can be stubborn too. One frequent example is the non-state actor with few assets, a taste for non-Trinitarian warfare (e.g. raiding or terrorism), and a lack of Western rationalism. Groups like this, particularly if their members enjoy engaging in warfare and seldom pause to count their casualties, can be hard to beat. The Apaches in the American Southwest, the Chechens in the 1850s and 1990s, or various tribes of Pathans come to mind.

In the long history of warfare, the most common contest has been between the soldier (an employee of the state) and the warrior (a combatant from a non-state entity). The first has usually been sent to create stability, the second is often looking for opportunities to engage in rapine, looting, blood feuding, etc. One of the oldest techniques that the solider has for winning this conflict is the punitive expedition.

Once again, the Apaches have slipped off the Reservation, or the Pathans have infiltrated though the Khyber Pass, or some German tribesmen have paddled over the Rhine. Farms have been torched, women raped, throats have been slit, and then the warriors have scampered back to their usual haunts.

So, once again, the Buffalo Soldiers, or the Gordon Highlanders, or the Legionaries of XXII Primigenia have to head off into the wilderness, and… Smack! (The goat herd is dead), Smack! (The crops just got burned in the fields), Smack! (The chief’s house is in ruins). A dozen soldiers are probably dead, and though they are mourned they can be readily replaced. Probably, a couple of dozen warriors (or more) are slain and they won’t be replaced for a generation or so. The survivors will have to answer the unvoiced questions: "Have you had enough yet?" "Will you stay peaceful now?"

History tells us that the Apaches were eventually tamed; the sundry tribes of the Pathans learned to stay quite for decades at a time, and the Germans stayed on their side of the Rhine until Rome fatally weakened. Punitive tactics work. Alas, contemporary Western notions of what is right now mitigate against their use.

In a broad sense, punitive tactics violate the Geneva Conventions — those rules which Western Soldiers (only!) abide by, largely because of distinctions between "military" and "civilian" status which have next to no bearing in most contemporary situations. Yet in most ways, punitive tactics are a merciful measure as they shorten conflicts by going right to the heart of a problem and excising it. It should also be pointed out that, usually, punitive tactics were only earmarked for conflicts of soldiers against warriors; wars between states could see such tactics reined in.

Today, we eschew the practical and direct as a host of actors on the periphery of a conflict insist on ‘rational’ purposes for our activities. They seek indirect tentative and unrealistic solutions for problems that are best met with a quick, rapid response. Still, there are ways….

In May 2004, an Israeli Defence Force (IDF) armored personnel carrier blew up in the southern end of the Gaza strip. As their comrades searched for all the body parts of the six dead Israeli soldiers (Israeli practices require that every identifiable fragment of a corpse be retrieved for burial), Hamas gunmen open fire. While the Israelis want to leave Gaza, they will not do so if their departure gives Hamas the illusion of a ‘victory’. Therefore, it was time to smack someone around.

In response to the deaths of their six soldiers, the IDF stepped up its presence in southern Gaza for a week. Ostensibly, the IDF was looking for tunnels used by smugglers (of which there are many), but what they really did was stay until about 40 ‘warriors’ had been killed and several dozen homes that had been used for tunnels or as firing posts were demolished. Then the operation was declared to be successful and was terminated.

Citing Gaza, in the long Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is perhaps not the best example of the successful use of punitive expeditions, but one should note that Israel is successfully using all of the tactics that have served to protect civilized states from barbarians: Punitive expeditions, security barriers, and collective responsibility (e.g. bulldozing the family homes of Shaheed). Israel is winning.

In Pakistan, the Northwest Frontier is now called a ‘Tribal Area’ and remains a region that is notoriously difficult (if not impossible) to control. This spring, the Pakistani Army announced a policy that went clear back to the days of the Raj — "Collective responsibility". This meant that punitive damage would be inflicted on villages that continued to harbor ‘Foreign fighters’ (e.g. al Qaeda and Taliban members). A number of the latter soon cleared out for unknown parts in advance of a major Pakistani army sweep.

Over 80 years ago, the RAF was attempting to keep order in the same parts of Iraq that now give the US-led Coalition such trouble. Unruly Sunnis and enraged Wahhabis were in revolt. In the early 1920s, when a village turned out to be hostile, the RAF would first drop leaflets advising the inhabitants to clear out immediately. Meanwhile, out in the distance, the flocks and herds of the villagers were strafed from the air. As soon as the inhabitants cleared out, their homes would be bombed. The rebellion ended relatively quickly and inexpensively for the British.

In the current Jihadist conflict, it might be time for the swift hand to appear once more: An ancient time-honored remedy that mercifully quells trouble quickly reinforces stability, and which (generally) tends to punish the guilty and spare the innocent. Imagine how much nicer the world would be, if the insurgents with a sanctuary area who dream of ambushing their next set of aid-workers, kidnapping their next civil engineers, or decapitating their next journalist are swiftly and severely thrashed, and then the survivors are asked "Had enough yet?" Eventually, the answer will be "Yes".

"Fanaticism is not the cause of war. It is the means which helps savage peoples to fight."

-- Winston Churchill, The River War, 1899

"He enjoys prophesying the imminent fall of the capitalist system and is determined to play a part, any part, in its burial, except that of mute."

-- Harold Macmillan, on the British socialist Aneurin Bevan.

"If man does find the solution for world peace it will be the most revolutionary reversal of his record we have ever known."