Our Army’s March to Entropy

by John Thompson

09/29/03

Canada has had an army before, and — if necessity forces us to — we might have one again. We barely have one now.

An army is a living breathing entity, made up of the sum of its individuals, and its vitality depends upon the morale, training, doctrine and equipment that those individuals have. If all is well, one can see the tough practical killers of 1917-18 or 1944-45, bitching and grumbling as they tore the guts out of some of the best troops Germany every assembled.

The raw stuff that made Canada’s armies in those wars is still there — man for man, the Canadian soldier can still impress their colleagues in the forces of our Allies. Collectively, we don’t impress them at all. I have heard many variations on "you have excellent soldiers but you don’t have enough men/equipment/supplies/support/collective training…"

The decline in strength and capabilities in our Armed Forces (particularly our Army) has gone on so long that we seldom remark on it anymore. Perhaps it is time that we looked a little more closely.

For thousands of years, Armies have consisted of four elements: Infantry who provide the protection; cavalry who provide the maneuver element; firepower (archers once, artillery now); and the fourth element of sappers, medics, supply clerks, and all the rest of those who are "force multipliers" by letting the three main elements perform their tasks as efficiently as possible.

Infantry are the foundation of an army. Only infantry can take ground from an enemy, and only infantry can hold it. While they can be deadly in their own right, they also receive most of the casualties in combat. An army needs them stubborn, hardy, confident in their skills and it needs a lot of them. Canada’s regular Army carries nine battalions of infantry on its books — and used to have 10 until the undeserved disbandment of the Airborne Regiment.

When the author was a humble artillery gunner (1977), Canada’s Regular battalions each consisted of four rifle companies, composed of three platoons of 30-40 men. There was a support company with a platoon of scouts, of sappers, one of eight 81mm mortars, and an anti-tank platoon along with an HQ company. Today our battalions usually sport two companies of two platoons and have just dispensed with the sapper and mortar platoons to save more manpower. To bring a battalion up to strength for an overseas mission, other Regular and Reserve units (who are even worse off for manpower and kit) are combed out to make the numbers up.

The Armour Corps performed the two roles assigned to cavalry: scouting and "shock action" (breaking up enemy formations with the speed and violence in a combined assault, or for clashing their counterparts). Of our four Armoured Regiments in 1975, three had a mix of three squadrons of 19 Centurion tanks — then at the end of their service life — and a squadron of 21 light reconnaissance vehicles. Now two thin squadrons of 12 reconnaissance vehicles are the norm and, while the Coyote is an excellent vehicle for its role, our paltry collection of old tanks is retired.

Firepower comes from artillery nowadays, and it largely defines the power that a military formation can project. Most modern NATO armies use 155m guns that can start pestering an enemy with 40kg shells around 30km away. In 1977, Canada had four regular regiments of artillery. One was assigned to partner the Airborne Regiment in a light ready deployment brigade and had two batteries of eight light L5 105mm guns (which is largely responsible for my poor hearing), the other three sported four batteries of eight self-propelled M109 155mm guns.

The new "improved" look for Canada’s undermanned regular artillery regiments will see them with one battery of six towed 105mm guns (at least the L5 has been retired, and two "batteries" of eight 81mm mortars, recently retired from infantry service. A modern 105mm gun fires a shell weighing around 14 kgs and can reach out some 13kms. Mortars are very useful infantry weapons, but only have a range of 5 km and a 81mm mortar bomb doesn’t convey the same impression that a 155mm howitzer shell does.

So, we have an Army with infantry battalions have a third of the strength they had a few years ago; shrunken armoured regiments that can only fill half of their usual roles, and artillery regiments with a tiny fraction of the firepower they once had… If anyone tells you these are "improvements" you can call him a stupid liar to his face.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca