Rethinking nuclear retaliation

by John Thompson

09/22/03

Little things can set a train of thought in motion. Among my circle of family and friends, three pregnancies have ended in miscarriage in the last three weeks… distressing news in each case, and enough to prompt the disturbing thought that this might be a result of some malignant act. The thought is a natural human one, but ridiculous given that my family and friends are strewn all across North America. Still, what would happen if this was the case?

In H.G. Well’s novel The Shape of Things to Come came out in the 1930s, and predicted a world conflict with mass bombing attacks using chemical and biological weapons. His prediction was that this would lead to a dark age and the collapse of civilization (to be created anew by a glorious era of science and socialism). Anyway, among the fictional episodes described by Wells, the Chinese accidentally developed a ‘sterility’ gas that they dumped on Japan — eliminating all reproduction by human beings in the target area.

Such a weapon, should one ever exist, would be the ultimate act of genocide and the ultimate form of contempt and hatred. Our problem is that, in an age where science fiction can become science fact all too readily, a biological agent like this could appear in coming years.

We are just entering into an era of interlinked technological revolutions that may prove to have a greater impact that the Industrial Revolution and the introduction of electricity. However, all human innovation can be turned as easily to warfare as to any other field of activity. The tidal wave of developments in microbiology and genetics promises to solve hundreds of problems — while creating dozens more.

It is now possible to ‘retro-engineer’ old viruses like smallpox, with easily available chemicals and lab equipment. It is also possible to tweak such a virus so that it is different from anything that came before — so it is more virulent, hardier, has slightly different symptoms, and communicable. It also may soon be possible to specifically engineer viruses for particular effects — like using the agent in measles and mumps that result in adult sterility — and tailoring them for particular ethno-cultural groups.

If we can tailor viruses to remove alien pests like Suriname Cane Toads in Australia without killing native amphibians, or to destroy Ergot fungus in grain without rending it unfit for consumption, then it becomes possible to produce an agent that causes sterility in humans. Tailoring it for specific groups of people might take another decade or so, but it will happen.

If a small laboratory for a small corporation could produce new genetic products (and they already are), it also means that a non-state actor such as al Qaeda to produce new weapons without the world learning about it until it is too late. Likewise, a government might decide to indirectly sponsor and support such a project through a series of cut-outs.

We know, all too clearly, from trying to unravel al Qaeda or search for Iraq’s weapons programs, how difficult it is to trace the links and prove exactly who planned or funded a terrorist action. But what happens when something much worse than the World Trade Centre attack occurs?

Suppose there was an attack where suddenly no live children were being born in North American and Western Europe, or where thousands of Israeli Jews were suddenly dropping dead in the streets while Palestinian Arabs remained untouched, or where…

This would be an intolerable form of attack, especially for North Americans where people from every background and ethnic group in the world are a part of our citizenry. In responding, there are three principles that should guide the response.

Firstly, no such attack must be allowed to let the attacker (whoever it may be) have a net benefit from his action. One attack of this kind would be one too many.

Secondly, the exact identity of the attackers might be a mystery, but an attack of this severity cannot let the usual niceties of restraint get in the way of a response. Somebody will know who the guilty party is, and it will be essential to get the attackers quickly and learn everything possible about how the agent of the attack was produced.

Thirdly, if an attack is so inherently genocidal, then the people who the attacker believes will benefit from his actions, cannot be allowed to do so no matter how innocent they are.

The principal of mutual assured destruction (MAD) kept the nuclear sword sheathed through the long decades of the Cold War. It might be time to dust off the doctrine and prepare it against an age where devastating biological weaponry becomes widely available.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca