Hunting ‘Guerrillas’ in Iraq

by John Thompson

08/04/03

The Coalition forces in Iraq have a guerrilla war on their hands. The enemy consists of former Baathist militias and Fedayeen Saddam -- men who profited from Saddam’s reign and know that their future is less than assured when the new Iraqi government emerges. Others are Islamic Fundamentalists and other scum, drawn by the chance to come into Iraq and kill some Westerners.

There is reason to be worried — first for the dozens of American troops the guerrillas have managed to kill. The guerrillas can also destabilize Iraq’s emerging order, and could even conceivably manage to get Saddam back in power; unlikely, yes, but the Baathists are the best-organized political force in Iraq.

But in all guerrilla campaigns, there is one critical issue on which everything else hangs.

During the liberation of Luzon in the Philippines in early 1945, a group of American Army Rangers went off on a long march to perform a raid deep in Japanese lines. Their objective was a POW camp, where many of the survivors of Bataan were kept — and the Japanese had already massacred the captives in another camp when it appeared that they could be freed.

The camp was guarded by about 300 Japanese guards, and thousands of other Japanese troops were in the vicinity, but the 200 Rangers had help — an equal number of Filipino guerrillas and the total support of local Filipinos. This made all the difference. The Japanese were caught completely unprepared, every prisoner came out alive, and the raiding force slipped out unharmed.

In November 1966, Che Guevara landed in Bolivia from Cuba to ignite a Marxist insurgency there. Less than a year later, he died in a Bolivian schoolroom and the rest of his band was rapidly hunted down and killed.

There is a lesson here. A force of guerrillas can survive and prosper only if the local people let them do so. On this, everything hangs. For people who find themselves between a guerilla force and the military which is hunting them, the decision to cooperate with either side depends on calculation (who has the most to offer me?), fear (who is more likely to harm me?), and grudges (who do I hate more?).

Mao said that guerrillas were fish that swam in the sea of the people. Some seas can be very bad for fish.

If people are prepared to cooperate with guerillas, they feed them, shelter them, and stash their arms and equipment. Often they will provide intelligence and security — providing timely warning of the arrival of hostile troops, and helping to plan attacks. Some will even deliberately mislead the troops who pursue guerrillas. The reverse is also true — people who are hostile to guerrillas will expose their arms caches and volunteer information to their enemies.

With a few exceptions, almost all of the attacks on Coalition troops have occurred among the Sunni Arabs in the northwest of the country and in some key Baghdad neighborhoods. The northeast has been largely quiet, and the Shi’ite attack on some British troops turns out to have been a mistake; six British military policemen died when the locals reacted to a rumor that the soldiers had arrived to disarm them. Instead, the British troops were on a training mission for the new police force being raised in the area, and gave their lives to let their trainees escape. The conduct of these British soldiers left a real impression among the Shi’ia and no further episodes have occurred.

Guerrilla campaigns can last for years, even for decades. If these Iraqi guerrillas intended to preserve the legacy of Saddam’s regime, they have done an awful job — as the corpses of his two sons amply demonstrate. The recent arrest of his bodyguards in Tikrit also demonstrates that the Coalition troops that are looking for Saddam have been getting close on numerous occasions. Both are proof positive that a lot of Iraqis are willing to provide information to Saddam’s enemies. Even Saddam’s own tribesmen and erstwhile neighbors in Tikrit are volunteering intelligence.

The guerrillas themselves have had to adapt their tactics; major ambushes don’t do anything except get them killed — dozens died when the US troops counterattacked immediately. Also, cache after cache of arms has turned up; giving evidence that a substantial informant network has developed to help.

Attacks on Coalition troops will probably be killing American servicemen (and officers of the new Iraqi government) for some months. But every month, they will probably become weaker and more irrelevant. It looks like American might win two wars in one.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca