Small Wars and Iraq

by John Thompson

02/24/03

Military history brings mixed rewards for those who read it. On one hand, it is a fascinating subject filled with fascinating stories and many clear lessons that have universal application. On the other hand, there is the eternal frustration of watching politicians and commentators who seldom read history repeating ancient mistakes time and time again.

The Book of Ecclesiastes says that the path of wisdom is a painful one and, after banging my head against a wall so frequently out of exasperation, I know this is true… especially these days and especially in dealing with Iraq.

Among the more carefully annotated and well-thumbed books in my library are two especially relevant books: Norman Dixon’s classic 1975 study "The Psychology of Military Incompetence" and Colonel C.E. Callwell’s exhaustive review of the 19^th Century’s minor conflicts "Small Wars" — I have his 1906 edition, which is the definitive one.

Dixon, an experienced bomb-disposal expert during WW-2, and a psychologist after it, wasn’t being particularly critical of the military ethos in his book. Rather, he was studying the causes of failure and tested his findings by looking at successful military leaders. Examining the failings of military leadership is simple — lost battles and massive casualties are clear indications of incompetence and easy to study. However, the anatomy of military failure applies equally well to politics, the civil service and the business world where failure and success are not so easy to identify.

The main finding in "The Psychology of Military Incompetence" is that hierarchical organizations tend to attract anal-retentive conformists who place careerism ahead of moral courage. I’m sure most of us can draw up a little list of senior political figures that might be described thus. Interestingly, some of Dixon’s 14 identified characteristics of the incompetent include:

• A tendency to reject or ignore information which conflicts with preconceptions;
• Obstinate persistence in given tasks even after failure is manifest;
• Indecisiveness and an willingness to abdicate from decision making;
• An undue readiness to find scapegoats;
• A habit of suppressing or distorting bad news.

These sound distressingly familiar.

Colonel Callwell’s book has even more application to the current crisis. His book reviews the whole of the 19^th Century’s experiences in ‘small wars’ — those where a Western-style Army fought with tribal levies, guerrillas, bandits, and non-Western armies around the world. There were a lot of such wars, ranging from the narrow British victories over the large well-armed and well trained forces of the Sikh Khalsa in the 1840s, to fighting against Boer Commandos, Zulu Impis, Apache and Comanche marauders, Arab slavers, Afghan snipers, Algerian and Moro Pirates, ad infinitum.

It was a busy century and there were a lot of examples to draw from. Bad examples included the circumstances that let the British lose an entire army in a ill-timed and mismanaged retreat from Afghanistan in 1842, led Custer to disaster at Little Big Horn, and got a large Italian force massacred by Ethiopian tribesman at Adowa. In dissecting such disasters and examining the brilliant victories, Callwell came to three conclusions.

When confronting a possible war with a local malcontent, it is vital to:

1. Show no signs of indecision or irresolution, this only encourages them to take full advantage of the situation and become much stronger than they should be.
2. Waste no time. Situations can change if you let them do so.
3. Go right for the one thing that your opponent must protect, and then defeat his whole army by shattering his best troops. (Interestingly, Alexander the Great — often hugely outnumbered by the Persians — usually charged straight at their elite troops and defeated the entire force by beating these.)

Alas, two of these three rules have been sadly neglected in the current confrontation with Iraq. Saddam Hussein is getting cocky and garnering support (even inside our own societies) as the UN Security Council fails — as it so often does — to correctly identify the problem and resolve to deal with it firmly and quickly.

Time is passing, and time is Saddam’s Ally. The longer it takes for the UN to approve action, the closer summer’s heat comes, and the less likely it is that America will get the support it needs.

The third maxim will probably not be violated. For a start, US military planners are remarkably well read (much more so than the vast majority of their critics), and both Norman Dixon and Colonel Callwell get wide attention. Too bad that most politicians seldom read much more than opinion polls.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca