Overseas Terrorism in Canada, International obligations, security, borders

The threat of substantial terrorist violence in Canada seems low, although it is by no means remote. So far, when terrorists have killed Canadians in the last 30 years, it has largely been as a result of attacks on other targets — whether in Canada or abroad. Even the deadly Air India bombing was directed against one aircraft of India’s national airline. The 27 Canadians that were killed (so far) in al Qaeda attacks have largely died because the citizens of other Western nations were the immediate targets.

This seeming lack of direct malevolence does not guarantee our safety. Osama bin Laden has promised that Canadians will pay for being a Western ally in Afghanistan in 2001/2002, and al Qaeda is dedicated to the downfall of the entire Western World, not just America. Hizbollah has also snarled that Canada will suffer for adding the organization to the list of terrorist groups to which our Criminal Code will apply inside our country. While the United States, Israel, Britain, France, Singapore, and Australia seem to have attracted more of the hostile attention of these groups than we have, a major action against Canada is inevitable at some time.

There are two indirect — but still vital -- threats to our safety that result from terrorism. Human misery is not just caused by direct death and destruction; lost influence, damaged trade, political decay and corruption are just as deadly to a society in their own way. Moreover, these are threats that make an indirect approach on our consciousness, and their danger might not be fully recognized until it is too late.

It is almost too late now.

Our reputation as a full partner in protecting our friends and allies from terrorism has sometimes been called into question — with the net effect that our closest ally and trading partner has occasionally constricted our commerce with them (costing us billions of dollars in trade) through tightened border security, and our reputation and influence abroad has diminished accordingly. A reputation takes a long time to be built, and an even longer time to be repaired if damaged. We have repair work to do.

The most profound threat that terrorism presents is one that goes to the very heart of Canadian society. We have opened our gates to the world with the full expectation that those who come here would share our ideals, and join in providing a living model to the rest of the world that it is possible for all people to live together in peace.

Instead, we have allowed the agents of the violence experienced in other nations to come here, mercilessly dominate their fellows from their home societies, and preach an Orwellian message that we must tolerate their intolerance, and that it is racist and condescending to question their motives and actions. Worse still, some of our political leaders have accepted this message.

George Clemenceau, the French President at the close of the First World War, remarked that "War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men." This is true, but so is General Charles de Gaulle’s later remark that "Politics are too serious a matter to be left to the politicians." The same observations are valid when considering Canada’s responses to terrorism.

International Obligations and Canadian Laws

In 1999 and 2000, the UN undertook a lead role in countering terrorism when it passed Security Council Resolutions (SCR) 1267 and 1333, requiring member states to freeze the assets and finances of a list of people and organizations associated with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. People on the Security Council list are to be banned from international travel, and UN members are prohibited from selling arms to them. The list was expanded in 2002 with SCR 1390 — which incorporates all members of the al Qaeda network, and lists numerous other terrorist organizations as well.

Ottawa has fully agreed to meet the demands of these Resolutions, but has sometimes been slow in meeting its obligations. In December 2002, the UN quietly discussed a report that complained of this slowness, when we failed to file the names of three Canadian al Qaeda members with the Security Council.

Other UN and International Conventions and Protocols on terrorism of which Canada is a signatory include:

The 1963 Tokyo Convention, which permits nation-states to act against those who threaten civilian airliners while on board (which we ratified in 1970);
The 1970 Hijacking (Hague) Convention, which outlaws aircraft hijacking;
The 1971 Civil Aviation Safety (Montreal) Convention, which expands on the 1970 Convention by outlawing additional man-made threats to airline safety;
The 1973 Internationally Protected Persons (New York) Convention; essentially declaring that diplomats and the like are off-limits for terrorist attacks. This reaffirmation of the protected status of ambassadors has not been much respected;
The 1979 Hostages (New York) Convention; outlawing the taking of hostages;
The 1980 Nuclear Material (Vienna) Convention; asking all nations to criminalize a number of offences that involve nuclear material;
The 1988 Civil Aviation (Montreal) Protocol, which adds new offences to civil aviation — including attacking people, facilities, and aircraft on the ground at airports;
The 1988 Maritime Safety (Rome) Convention; outlawing a number of offences against civilian shipping and navigation;
The 1988 Sea Platforms Protocol --- extending the Maritime Convention to platforms, such as oil derricks, which are sited at sea.
The 1991 Plastic Explosives (Montreal) Convention; this calls on signatory nations to "mark" explosives with trace elements that let it (or its residues) be clearly identified — so that sources of explosive used by terrorists can be identified.
The 1997 Terror Bombings (New York) Convention; this calls upon member states to cooperate with each other in the suppression of terrorism, and to include new measures in their domestic legal codes.
The 1999 Terrorist Financing (New York) Convention -- this essentially demands that UN members debar fundraising for the purposes of terrorism within their own countries.

Canada has signed and ratified all of these agreements. We have been generally faithful to them, and the appropriate laws and regulations needed to comply with them have been enacted. We are having problems complying with the latest one.

Our Federal Government has expanded on the Criminal Code to produce a formidable series of new offences related to terrorism. Canada’s new anti-terrorism laws are largely incorporated in Bill C-36 -- one of the most complex, multi-jurisdictional pieces of legislation ever passed in Parliament. These new laws came into effect in 2002. Of particular interest are some of the new sections now in the Criminal Code:

Section 83.02: This declares that providing property for a terrorist group or act (at home or abroad) is an offence with a maximum sentence of 10 years. An example of an offence might be the purchase of night vision goggles and GPS receivers for Hizbollah to use in Lebanon.
Section 83.03: Fund-raising for terrorism — directly or indirectly — is also an offence with a maximum sentence of 10 years. Shaking a tin can on the sidewalk for MeK, or wiring funds to a Pakistani bank that backs al Qaeda, is now illegal.
Section 83.04: Holding property that is to be used in a terrorist attack is now an offence. Keeping a pair of Molotov cocktails in your backpack for a friend to throw at the RCMP in a protest for the PKK comes under this section of the Criminal Code, but — alas — doing so for some masked anarchist at another Anti-Globalization/Anti Capitalism staged riot does not.
Section 83.08: Anyone in Canada, or any Canadian abroad, may not knowingly provide any direct or indirect services, property, or money for the benefit of a terrorist group. A summary conviction on this offence can result in a $100,000 fine and a year in prison, and an indictment may result in 10 years in prison. Technically, lobbying an MP to read a petition denouncing the arrest of a terrorist front leader or passing the bucket at a rally on behalf of a terrorist group comes under this law.
Section 83.1: Canadian Banks, trust companies, insurance agencies, and other financial institutions must report to the RCMP and CSIS on the financial assets of any individual or group listed by the UN, and must make monthly reports to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). A summary conviction on this offence can result in a $100,000 fine and a year in prison, and an indictment may result in 10 years in prison. So far, this seems to be working in some cases — groups that are off the Federal Government’s list might still be exempt.
Section 83.13: This clears the way for the freezing and seizure of terrorist assets by the federal and provincial governments.
Section 83.18: Participating in a terrorist activity or organization (even a Front organization) is punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment. An al Qaeda recruiter who travels to Montreal from Pakistan, recruits new members, accepts offers of help from sympathizers, and trains his recruits in some basic techniques will have violated just about every sub-section of this law. A Tamil Tiger member who does the same is still exempt at the moment.
Section 83:19: Facilitating a terrorist activity (by, for example, photographing a potential target, or getting black market passport counterfoils) can get the offender up to 14 years imprisonment.
Section 83.2: Committing an offence for a terrorist group can get one a life sentence. While violent acts have always been covered by the Criminal Code in one way or another, this adds a much greater weight of punishment that may be applied to actions in which nobody was killed or injured.
Section 83.21: Giving instructions (such as the floor plans to a laboratory or the schematics of a security system) to a terrorist group — whether or not they actually use them in an attack — can get the offender a life sentence.
Section 83.23: Harboring or concealing a terrorist group member can result in a 10 year sentence.

These are impressive and useful laws, but they hang on one key point -- whether or not a terrorist group has actually been listed as one. However, unlike allied nations that are taking more of a blanket approach to place all terrorist groups under the aegis of their new laws, the Canadian government has opted to be selective by listing only those entities recommended for inclusion by Federal Solicitor General to the Governor in Council. To be listed, the Solicitor General must have "reasonable grounds" that a group has either engaged in terrorism, or has supported a terrorist group (in short, front groups can be in serious trouble).

It does appear that part of the rationale for not declaring a group to be a terrorist organization is the ability of its front organizations and supporters to influence our parliamentarians. Instead of immediately adopting the Security Council list, Canada has listed various groups over many months. Of the terrorist groups operating in the world, the following are listed for the Criminal Code (as of June 18^st, 2003):

The Abu Nidal Organization (aka Black September, Fatah Revolutionary Council);
Abu Sayaf Group
Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade (but not its parent group, the PLO)
Al-Gana’at Al Islamiyya
Al-Ithhihad Al-Islami
Al Qaeda Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Asbat al-Ansar
Aum Shinri Kyo
Babbar Khalsa/Babbar Khalsa International (counted as two groups by the Canadian Government)
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (aka Jihad Group, Egyptian Islamic Group, Vanguards of Conquest — which is banned in its own right as well)
Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA. Basque Homeland and Liberty)
Hamas
Harakat ul-Mujahidn
Hizbollah (aka Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, etc)
International Sikh Youth Federation
Islamic Army of Aydin
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Jayesh-e-Mohammed
Jemmaah Islamiyyyah
Lashkar-e Jhangvi (a group with which the authors were unfamiliar until it was listed by the Canadian government)
Lashkar-e Tayyiba
Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK)
National Liberation Army (ELN)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Salafist Group for Call and Combat:
Sendero Luminoso
United Self Defence Forces of Colombia
Vanguards of Conquest (see entry 11. above).

There are groups that are conspicuous by their absence. Almost among them were Babbar Khalsa (BKI) and the some related Sikh groups — listed on the day (June 18^th, 2003) this paper was due to go into print, and some 25 years after they murdered their first Canadian citizen on Canadian soil. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam are still not on Canada’s list of banned terrorist groups, despite being banned in the UK, being described by the US as a terrorist organization (and are suppressed there), and being included on the UN Security Council’s list of terrorist individuals and entities.

Among the many other groups that have escaped being listed are the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the Animal Liberation Front (which, to be fair, has also escaped the UN Security Council’s attention too,) and dozens of others.

Instead of applying the new laws to all terrorist groups in Canada, the use of a government "list" of selected groups is embarrassing. As partners in the "War on Terrorism" we seem slow, timid, and unsure of ourselves. What is even more embarrassing is the failure of the Federal Government to lay charges based on any of its new laws at the time of writing.

With the recent addition of the BKI and ISYF to the list of banned groups, it becomes possible to see if Ottawa is serious about its new laws. Members of these two groups have built temples and schools, run businesses, and have been quite open in many of their activities for years. It is not enough to pass laws, they have to be used; and an unused law is worse than no law at all.

Securing our Borders

The late 1999 arrest of Ahmed Ressam at the Port Angeles ferry crossing in Washington State threw the Americans into a state of alerted panic. As the calendar ticked over to 2000, it was thought that the global celebrations would be marred by a wave of terrorist attacks, and perhaps by catastrophic computer failures too. As it was, the world celebrated without any notable cybernetic hiccups or militant party-crashers. However, this was not the first time that the US worried about security threats coming from within Canada, nor would it be the last.

The first attempt by al Qaeda to topple the World Trade Centre in New York came in February 1993, when a large truck bomb was detonated under one of the towers in the hopes of collapsing one into the other. Six people were killed and over 1,000 were harmed by smoke inhalation, but the buildings remained intact until the 2001 attacks. The perpetrators of this 1993 attack were swiftly caught before they fled overseas, but the planned exit route for one of the attackers, Mahmud Abouhalima, would have taken him through Canada — where his brother Sherif had purchased a ticket for him.

Some of the first press reports after the September 11^th 2001 attacks stated that some of the 19 hijackers had entered the United States through Canada. They easily could have done so, although all of the attackers had directly entered the US with visitor or tourist visas in 2000 and 2001. It did not help Canada’s reputation when Nabil al-Marabh was arrested while attempting to illegally enter the US from Canada with $45,000 in cash and jewelry a week after the 9-11 attacks.

As the United States clamped down on its borders, one of the first effects was chaos at the Canada US crossing sites — and this was horrible news for the Canadian economy. About 33% of the entire Canadian GDP results from trade to the United States; it is the lynch pin to our national prosperity. Some estimates place the daily traffic both ways over the US-Canadian border at 500,000 individuals, about 50,000 trucks, and around $2 billion dollars in goods and services. The disruptions caused by extensive security checks at border crossings restricted business travel, threw off production on both sides as ‘just-in-time inventory’ deliveries failed to arrive as scheduled, and severely limited tourism, shopping trips, and much more.

Neither country can afford such disruption for very long. However, the enormous economic damage wrought by the September 11^th attacks — in terms of lost production, insurance claims, higher premiums, cancelled travel, and new security expenses — has been staggering. The direct costs of the attacks alone will probably reach $100 billion dollars, and the indirect costs are higher still. One can imagine what the financial fallout of a worse incident will be. Moreover, a large part of America’s industrial capacity in the northern states has been idle or under-utilized for some time, and if security issues were to continue to disrupt trade, many of the manufacturing jobs attracted by Canada’s cheaper dollar might head back south.

Reassuring the United States by enhancing border security is a vital concern, and some excellent progress has already been made to this effect by the US and Canadian governments. The Smart Border Initiative may be the most practical program undertaken by any Canadian government in the last decade. It will preserve the economic advantages we have in our trade with the US, and will also go far to making the border more efficient and much more secure. However, there may be some unintended consequences…

The Action Plan for border security includes a number of measures that will severely restrict people smuggling, and international travel into Canada and the US with forged documents. Abusing the refugee system will also become much more difficult. Among the 30 points for the plan are:

Permanent resident cards for Canada and the US, which will include biometric data. This would allow a check to see if the card holder is the same person to whom it was issued, by using something like an iris or fingerprint scan and a reader to look at the data on a magnetic strip on the document;
Jointly developing common biometric identifiers for US and Canadian travel documents so that, for example, American and Canadian scanners can reliably read identity documents from either country;
Reviewing asylum/refugee practices to ensure that all applicants are screened for security reasons, and to share information on such claimants in the future;
Negotiating a safe-third country agreement (by agreeing that a number of countries are safe for would-be refugee applicants — and that there is no need for either Canada or the US to entertain applicants from there);
A joint US-Canadian review of visa waiver lists (e.g. agreeing on those countries and persons for whom visas would be necessary or unnecessary to enter our two countries), and sharing look-out lists at Visa Offices. This would limit the ability of, for example, a people smuggler who has been deported from Canada to China from getting a visa to the US in the future;
Joint Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record programs will explore means to identify risks posed by passengers on international flights arriving in each other’s nation. Ideally, this could mean that both American and Canadian officials would be aware of the passenger list of any flight to either nation (or between them) well before the aircraft lands. This should also cut down on the old "undocumented refugee" ploy as passengers will be firmly identified before departing;
Joint Passenger Analysis Units in Canada and the US allowing officers from both nations to be present to share data and information on passengers on incoming aircraft are already undergoing trials in several international airports;
Canada and the US will develop compatible immigration databases — not so much as a way of keeping track of individuals (although this could happen for some cases), but as a means of improving the sharing of intelligence and analysis of new trends;
Both countries will also post more immigration officers overseas (particularly at airports) and will improve joint training with airline personnel;
Both countries will look for means to overcome legal and operational challenges to joint deportations, and to explore ways of encouraging ‘uncooperative’ countries to accept the repatriation of their nationals.

Effectively, these measures will result in a major overhaul of our immigration system, particularly with respect to refugees, without triggering a major debate on the issue until it is too late to prevent their implementation. Linking these reforms to our trading relationships with the United States is correct — as the Americans will simply not tolerate a continuing threat out of Canada — and will preserve Canadian prosperity.

In a conference in Calgary, in February 2002, James Bisset, the architect of our refugee system, argued that the way it works now costs Canadians about $5-7 billion dollars a year (an estimate based on administration expenses, social benefits, and legal costs). By clamping down on the system, people smuggling will become less attractive to criminals, the risks of importing terrorists and their supporters will be reduced, and we could realize a ‘Refugee Dividend’ that can be diverted to foreign aid or infrastructure development in our more overstrained cities.

Other aspects of the Action Plan are already speeding trade over the border by deploying ‘smart’ technologies to protect shipments of goods (like ‘just in time’ inventory shipments of automobile parts) over the border, better controls over the contents of cargo containers arriving at seaports, pre-clearing some shipments and travelers away from the border, and by working on harmonized commercial processing protocols.

The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and their marine counterparts are doing much to hamper smuggling efforts over the Canada-US border. The sharing of data on commercial fraud and smuggling techniques will enhance policing efforts in both countries. These will all go far in reducing the ability of organized crime (and by supporters of terrorist groups) to utilize another easy money-maker.

The willingness of Ottawa to progress on those portions of the Action Plan that pertain to limiting people smuggling and illegal immigration will be another key indicator of our fitness as a partner in the security of our closest ally.

Assets and Liabilities

Success or failure in any campaign to reduce the potential of terrorism coming from within Canada rests with the individuals who work its frontlines — officers from CSIS, the RCMP (and virtually all other Canadian police forces), customs agents, immigration officers, diplomats, and many others. As individuals, many are not that distinguished or capable, while some are outstanding in their conduct and the performance of their duties. Taken as an average, they know what they are doing and are performing as well as they can in the face of some considerable handicaps.

There is much praise for our police and security services among their counterparts in the United States. Generally, in the State Department, in the Pentagon, in the FBI, and elsewhere, Americans involved in homeland security and counter-terrorism tend to respect their Canadian counterparts, value the relationships they have with them, and admire their professionalism. However… the next comment is usually something along the lines of "Why can’t you [in the collective sense] get your act together?"

Indeed. While no democratic nation can expect to have a 100% effective system for countering terrorism, there are some areas where Canada could stand major improvement.

Before the 9-11 attacks, low morale often plagued Canada’s counter-terrorism efforts. It was difficult to maintain professionalism when one’s efforts are often unappreciated and one’s department is perennially under-funded. For example, in 1993/94, the RCMP’s actual spending was $1,241.6 million, and their planned spending for 2000/2001 was $1.200.6 million — with eight years of an inflation rate of 1 to 2% nibbling away at capabilities while new responsibilities were being added.

A prolonged period of nibbling funding cuts will affect an organization’s capabilities and morale. Experienced officers tend to find that their motivation suffers; some will leave to seek private opportunities or take early retirement. Those who stay will either be tremendously motivated (certainly true in the case of many RCMP and CSIS officers) or will be those who really don’t care any more than they have to — and such people can be all too common in all walks of life. In any event, turnover increases and newcomers enter an organization whose overall levels of skill and experience have diminished year by year.

For the RCMP and for CSIS, this situation changed with the new "security" budget implemented in the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks. Lost funding was quickly restored and was speedily invested in new capabilities. This led to new problems. CSIS, long hampered by a shortage of officers with particular language and cultural skills, has brought in hundreds of new officers since 9-11. However helpful this influx is, most of the new officers are a long way from being seasoned — which means that mistakes will be made. After all, good judgment comes from experience and experience comes from using bad judgment.

Canadians have often heard stories about rivalries between CSIS and the RCMP (even though both organizations report to the same boss, Canada’s Solicitor General). It is true that there is a small measure of institutional rivalry — CSIS was created out of the RCMP’s Security Service. However, it must be remembered that the two organizations largely provide different functions and must produce different standards of proof. Intelligence agencies look for enough information to be confident in their assessments; police agencies need enough information to secure convictions. Different functions and priorities will always mean that the relationship between CSIS and the RCMP can never be smooth — and it is natural that this situation will continue.

If not always easily cooperating with CSIS, Canadian police forces have become much more used to cooperating with each other. In the last decade, there have been numerous multi-jurisdictional taskforces (often with involvement from Customs and Immigration officers) in dealing with organized criminal societies and other situations. This has eased some of the agency rivalries that used to exist between police forces, but some elements of tribalism will always remain.

In the main, Canadian police officers are professional, well trained, and those who have been dealing with issues of terrorism and organized crime are very well informed. However, the main weaknesses that police forces and crown prosecutors face also result from funding problems. Major investigations are expensive, and prosecutions are even more so (especially when the public purse is paying for both sides of a case). There can also be a reluctance to lay charges when the law is not yet widely understood, or has yet withstood a Charter of Rights and Freedom challenge. Notwithstanding Ottawa’s tough new laws on terrorism, no Canadian police force or Crown prosecutor is sure they will actually make it through the Supreme Court.

Canada’s Immigration officers and Customs officers are also a major component of our defences against terrorism. The latter work for Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) and can usually expect good support from their superiors for their efforts -- especially if there are revenues to be collected.

Many of the officers in Citizenship and Immigration do not feel that they receive the same support, and morale tends to be lower in the Department. While there are many experienced and professional front-line workers and administrators, there has been a high-turn over in key positions. In the past, there have been major communications problems within the department itself, let alone without outside agencies. These problems are being worked on, but the main problem cannot be tackled at present: There is little or no real willingness to reform the Immigration system in the Government, and the current system is partly the creation of a powerful lobby of immigration lawyers and consultants.

Many immigration and refugee lawyers and immigration advocates also find their way into the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). An alert officer who earmarks a case to be heard by it can have little confidence that a suspicious applicant will be turned down. The experienced Refugee Hearing officers (independent professional civil servants who sometimes acted much like crown prosecutors in IRB hearings) have been diminished both in numbers and authority. Moreover, even if the IRB finds reason to turn down an applicant’s bid to stay in Canada, there is little guarantee that this is the end of the story. Most refused applicants are expected to voluntarily deport themselves — and few personnel and resources are spent to ensure that they do. There are tens of thousands of people in Canada who are not supposed to be here, and we have no idea where many of them are.

Canada’s ability to track the illicit flow of money has improved markedly over the last five years, with the creation of Fintrac — which was created in response to G-8 and G-20 agreements to restrict the ability of international organized crime to move cash around. However, many American officials (where there are much stricter laws about the illicit flow of money) sourly regarded Fintrac as being somewhat limited in its scope. One former official with the Clinton Administration, and an expert on international terrorist money laundering, remarked that Canada was slow to create the organization and only gave the group "rubber teeth instead of real fangs". In 2002, Fintrac’s funding was raised from $22 million to $35 million.

Emergency measures organizations are vital in mitigating the damage and casualties from natural and man-made disasters — including terrorist attacks. The old adage about a penny’s worth of prevention certainly applies, as millions of dollars invested in planning, training emergency response organizations, and stockpiling material can literally save hundreds of millions in claims and secondary damage later on. In short, EMOs literally do pay for themselves. Preparation for a major terrorist attack can also yield dividends in handling the routine disasters — floods, chemical spills, major storms, etc.

Emergency preparedness is being boosted at all levels of government throughout Canada, with a greater emphasis on training and readiness for a major terrorist attack. However, the results have been spotty, with vast variances between the EMOs of different provinces and cities. Some of the most significant problems still lie with the absence of common standards of training, differing communications protocols, and low levels of automation in headquarters.

One important weakness that is being addressed is the low level of readiness for a terrorist incident with biological, chemical or radiological weaponry; and training has been provided for ambulance services, police and fire departments from across Canada. The recent outbreak of SARS in Toronto and the Mad Cow Disease episode in Alberta were able to provide a limited assessment of our improved abilities — and it seems that Ontario still has work to do.

In general, Canada’s ability to react to terrorism has much improved since the 9-11 attacks, and although there is much to do, most of Canada’s police and intelligence services are aware of their needs and priorities. Yet all of this is for naught if the political will to fight terrorism is absent. Even in Canada political will stems from the citizenry, and fundamentally, being ready for terrorism is the business of every citizen. This is the most important asset of them all.

Ever since Confederation, and even before 1867, it has been a dream of many Canadians that our society can be an example to the world; a place where many peoples can come together and live with peace, order, and good government. The reality we hope to achieve is possible, and so many of those who come here are fully prepared to participate in this.

Those who seek to dominate others inside Canada through fear and violence, or those who see it as a place to milk resources for terrorist struggles elsewhere, undermine our hopes and sully our reputation. We have no reason to tolerate their presence here, and owe it to our friends and allies to swiftly reduce the number of terrorist groups and front organizations that have established themselves inside Canada in order to perpetuate other people’s wars.

The Authors

John C. Thompson has been with the Mackenzie Institute since 1990, and is currently its president. Previously, he was with the Canadian Forces and the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

Joe Turlej worked with the Institute as a research associate from 1994 to 2002. He had to cut his links with this project after accepting an invitation from a major Canadian police force to serve as an intelligence analyst.

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John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca

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