The Threat Matrix:
Conceptualizing al Qaeda and its Role in the Wider Islamist Threat Environment

Table of Contents:

[Overview]
[The Threat Matrix and its component parts]
[The Category One Threat: Islamist State Sponsors]
[The Second Category Threat: Islamist Terrorist/Insurgent Organizations]
[Al Qaeda Affiliated/Member Groups: Middle East]
[Al Qaeda Affiliated/Member Groups: Asia]
[Al Qaeda Affiliated/Member Groups: Africa]
[The Third Category Threat: "Arab Afghans"]
[The Fourth Category Threat: The Support Infrastructure]
[The Pre-October 2001 Structure of Al Qaeda and the Islamist Network]
[Part Two: The operation of the Threat Matrix]
[Geopolitics: Islamist State Sponsors and the Threat Matrix]
[Brothers-In-Arms: Al Qaeda, Terrorist/Insurgent Groups and the "Arab-Afghans"]
[The Infrastructure of Islamist Terror]
["Spectacular" Attacks: The Ultimate Objective of Al Qaeda and the Threat Matrix]
[Chronology of Pre-September 11, 2001 Terrorist Actions]
[Chronology of Post-September 11, 2001 Islamist Terrorist Operations ]
[Conclusions]

The Pre-October 2001 Structure of Al Qaeda and the Islamist Network

According to Bodansky, bin Laden and his senior military commander Ayman al-Zawahiri, reorganized the network in 1998. Like the Iranian influenced HizbAllah, a shura or consultative council was established, incorporating members from the allied terrorist groups. The armed elements were organized into three tiers:

Tier 1: Incorporates bin Laden and Zawahiri and key loyal fighters who act as bodyguards and, when necessary, can form cells and deploy globally.

Paul Williams outlines the top leadership structure of the organization as follows:

• Emir: The leader being bin Laden
• Chief Council to bin Laden: Zawahiri
• Consultation Council (shura): The council approves major decisions including the selection of operational targets. Members also lead in the committees that answer to the council.
• Committees: Three of these exist, one for Islamic Study, one for ‘Military’ affairs, and one for Finance.

Tier 2: Includes the individual Islamist terrorist/insurgent groups that joined the network. Each has its own command structure, which in turn receives funding from al Qaeda and offers back logistical support, intelligence or operatives in support of overall strategic objectives.

Tier 3: These are the "Arab Afghans" who operate within various Islamist terrorist organizations, but also maintain close ties with others who have fought in Afghanistan, and the "second generation Afghans". Bodansky maintains that 10,000 of these trained terrorists were under the control of bin Laden as of the late 1990s.

To add to the complexity and the cohesion of the vast Islamist network are the bonds of blood and marriage that cement the political/military relations between leadership figures. In 1998, Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban married one of bin Laden’s daughters while bin Laden in exchange married an ethnic Pashtun woman. A similar bond was established between bin Laden and his military commander Ayman al-Zawahiri, whereby one of bin Laden’s sons married one of Zawahiri’s daughters. Bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Mohammad Khalifa, helped establish the Islamic Army of Aydin which later mounted the successful suicide operation against the USS Cole. To further demonstrate the cohesion and commitment the Islamists have towards their violent cause, one of bin Laden’s sons gave his life fighting for the Taliban.

A somewhat similar pattern emerged in the operations conducted by Ramzi Yousef, the lead terrorist in the first World Trade Center attack. On a number of occasions he turned to family members as helpers in his operations. While in Pakistan in 1994, his brother-in-law aided him in recruiting an assistant in his plot to blow 10 to 13 airliners out of the sky simultaneously. While in the Philippines, his brother assisted him by providing a legitimate business front as a cover from which to operate. Yousef even recruited his father and younger brother for an attack on a Shi’ite mosque in Iran that he "free lanced" on behalf of a Sunni organization. A substantial number of these relatives, like Yousef, were veterans of the Afghanistan Jihad. One of his uncles, also a veteran, had close ties to bin Laden.

According to Gunaratna, al Qaeda capitalized on the concept of family and nationality by organizing its cells along these lines. Various "families" manage specific functions within the larger organization: Algerians run credit card frauds; Libyans organize passports and travel documentation; while Egyptians manage the training camps.

Below are descriptions of how the various Threat Categories "linked up" with others and mounted terrorist operations or engaged in tasks in support of the al Qaeda-Islamist infrastructure. This structure and its operation make the threat both unique and extremely dangerous. What must be emphasized is that there is constant activity within the Threat Matrix, with organizations and individuals from the various categories working closely with others in order to carry out activities that include fund raising, recruitment and offensive operations.

Al Qaeda offered its state sponsors --already heavily involved in supporting regional terrorist groups-- an incredible opportunity to advance their regional and international interests. Not only did this provide Islamist states with plausible deniability, al Qaeda went even further by offering inspiration and its own expertise to terrorist and insurgent groups under its banner.

Bodansky argued before the September 11 attacks that there was a strategic shift occurring in the Islamic world. Traditional centres of power and influence such as the conservative regimes of Saudi Arabia and Egypt had lost ground as a result of their perceived loss of legitimacy. At the same time, regimes with an ability to strike with nuclear and ballistic missiles (Iran and Pakistan) were perceived as trying to assume leadership roles for the Islamic world. Sudan under Turabi wanted desperately to become a role model for other Muslim countries. In order for these three ambitious regimes to achieve their objectives, their shared perception was that the United States had to be removed as a player in the Middle East. Al Qaeda offered a perfect means with which to strike at their common enemy. Past encounters, such as the suicide bombings in Beirut and the attack on US forces in Somalia led them to conclude that the US’s tolerance for violence was very low and that al Qaeda could deliver the necessary "pain".

Al Qaeda and the proxy groups did not disappoint their sponsoring states. Sudan, one of the prime movers in the Islamist alliance has employed these resources to insure its national security. "Arab Afghans" were used in that country’s genocidal civil war against the southern Black Christians and Animists. Turabi also felt threatened by the close presence of American troops in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope. He and other Islamists wanted to drive them out of this strategic region, along sea lanes of the Horn of Africa. The training of Somali Islamic fighters, supported by "Arab Afghans", culminated in the October 1993 ambush of American Special Forces operating there. A total of eighteen Americans were killed, as well as hundreds of Somali gunmen.

There is a near seamless transition between these three components of the Threat Matrix. Veterans of the anti-Soviet campaign form the core of many Sunni Islamist organizations in the Middle East. Their common experience and zeal was not contained to the situation in Afghanistan and many gravitated towards opposition and underground organizations in their home countries. The stature these veterans have among fellow Islamists is almost mystical.

A symbiotic relationship exists between al Qaeda and its allied terrorist groups, each gaining immeasurably from interacting with one another. Member terrorist/insurgent organizations received training in camps run by bin Laden, Zawahiri and al Qaeda. Fierce religious indoctrination and paramilitary training in al Qaeda camps dramatically increased the lethality of the allied terrorist and insurgent organizations. There have been occasions where Islamist organizations attacked targets in response to assaults against the al Qaeda organization. In 1998, one day after the Hamas leader Yassin declared that he would attack Israel in retaliation for the Cruise Missile attacks in Afghanistan, a bomb exploded in Tel Aviv. However, Yassin claimed that his terrorist group had not carried out that attack. The Islamist alliance also facilitated terrorist-to-terrorist cooperation; Hamas, a Sunni Islamist organization, had members trained in Shi’ite Hizbollah camps in Lebanon.

It is not only the member groups that benefit from this training. The Islamist alliance itself expands its geographic reach with each additional group brought under its umbrella. These relationships in turn allowed al Qaeda to mount an operation in October 1993 against American Special Forces in Somalia and its ties to the Abu Sayyaf Group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Jemmah Islamiyyah facilitated anti-Western attacks in the Philippines and Indonesia in October 2002.

While the member terrorist groups are strengthened by joining, they also become drawn into the ideological influence of al Qaeda, which blames Western influence and interference for the "suppression" of a greater Islamist state. Consequently, most member groups end up refocusing their efforts into attacking Western/American targets or supporting major operations sanctioned by sponsoring states and al Qaeda. This is one of the reasons why Palestinian organizations are reluctant to become fully integrated; they cite what happened to the Egyptian groups who have ceased their Jihad in that country in favor of an anti-American campaign. Gunaratna quotes Israeli intelligence sources who feel that al Qaeda has penetrated the Occupied Territories and that they anticipate a major attack. In June 2000, Israeli security officials arrested Nabil Abu Aukel, a Palestinian trained in explosives at an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan.

The Islamist Support Infrastructure is critical to the efficient functioning of al Qaeda and the rest of the Threat Matrix. The vast and complex array of bogus and infiltrated charities and Islamic organizations offer an incredible opportunity for al Qaeda operatives to travel into conflict zones under their cover. Numerous examples exist where operatives have entered the former Yugoslavia, Kashmir or Chechnya posing as aid workers. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, it was their intention to attack Western troops acting as peacekeepers there.

In Pakistan, a Canadian-based al Qaeda operative, Ahmad Sa’id Al-Kadr, also known as "Al Kanadi" (e.g. ‘The Canadian’), working for an Islamic charity was arrested for the bombing of the Egyptian embassy there in 1995. Prime Minister Chretien intervened on his behalf with Pakistani authorities and he was released. His current whereabouts are unknown however two of his sons are detained in Afghanistan, captured while fighting for the Taliban and al Qaeda. One of these was captured after killing a US Army medic with a grenade. These detentions demonstrate that the "family concept" of Islamist terror exists in Canada as well.

Hyper-terrorist Ramzi Yousef, while in the Philippines, was financed by another al Qaeda member who utilized his position within several Islamic charities as cover. Muhammad Jamal Khalifa (also a veteran of the Afghan campaign) established a number of fronts including several "humanitarian organizations" and businesses. Each has channeled cash generated in Middle Eastern countries to al Qaeda operatives and its allied terrorist groups in the region, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Morro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

The operation of these fronts was infinitely more complex than acting merely as a conduit of cash for terrorist operations and provides some insight into how the Threat Matrix operates. Khalifa also acted as a recruiter, seeking promising individuals to send to various camps operated by the Islamist network. His position allowed him to be able to fund and give cover to individuals from the ASG and MILF while en route to radical religious training in Pakistan or to the terrorist training camps of Afghanistan. Individuals such as Khalifa were instrumental in spreading the Islamist ideology beyond the Middle East and Northern Africa. Al Qaeda offered paramilitary training and indoctrination which bolstered the capabilities of existing terrorist groups and insurgencies in the Asia-Pacific region, in return for access to other places where training bases could be located, access to non-Arabic recruits (being less likely to arouse suspicion while traveling) and information on areas where Western targets could be easily struck.

The Islamist infrastructure also acts as a political and propaganda mechanism for the other components of the Threat Matrix. Demonstrations orchestrated by various "cultural" organizations in the West against the "invasion of Afghanistan" (which up until October of 2001 served as the primary node of the Islamist alliance), attempted to sway Western governments and public opinion from crushing the hated Taliban regime. As an aside, two million Muslims immediately returned after the regime was crushed —- so much for the standard of Islamist care for the well-being of their Muslim brothers.

The Infrastructure also sprang into action when high-ranking Islamists were arrested for their terrorist-supporting activities. When Musa Abu Marzuq, who ran the political bureau of Hamas, was held for a deportation hearing by US authorities, numerous faxes and calls were placed on his behalf to the offices of politicians. Other Islamist-infiltrated and cover organizations attempted to portray him as a "prisoner of opinion and political struggle." When Sheik Wagdi Ghuniem, the anti-Semitic member of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, was barred from entering Canada, members of one organization gave interviews to the media arguing that "He teaches people to be peaceful" Ghuniem is infamous for his hate-speeches where chants such as "No to the Jews, descendants of the apes" are a regular occurrence.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the crackdowns on the Islamist networks, Islamist-supporting organizations began a campaign where they tried to claim that ethnic profiling was taking place by law enforcement agencies in the West and that a climate of fear existed within the Muslim communities. This was done in an effort to blunt police and security service efforts to dismantle the Islamist Support Infrastructure. It should also be specified that simply because a Muslim organization spoke out against the anti-terrorism tactics employed since September 11, 2001 does not automatically indicate tie to the Islamists here. Many non-Islamist Muslim organizations have expressed similar concerns.

Spectacular mass-casualty attacks have been the result when all the components of the matrix function together as planned. When the full weight of all the component parts is brought to bear in a single operation, the results are exceptionally devastating. Bodansky provides considerable insight into the planning and execution of the 1998 African embassy bombings and how all elements of the Threat Matrix converged to produce the two devastating and simultaneous explosions.

Iran provided both the inspiration for the operations as well as monitoring and oversight. The Islamist infrastructures, primarily those under control of Iranian Intelligence (bogus cultural and Islamic front organizations such as the Office for Islamic Culture and Guidance) provided cover for the movement of cash as well as assisted in a global survey of potential targets. According to Bodansky, the bombings were the fall-back option for a strike in Western Europe and Latin America which were both thwarted. Sudan provided advice on the situation in East Africa as well as fake Sudanese passports for several terrorists. The massive amount of explosives used was stored in Pakistan. Bin Laden and other key al Qaeda members took more of a hands-on approach in planning the attacks than did the intelligence agents of the state sponsors. Local terrorist support networks, aided and inspired by key Arab-Afghans, actually executed the operation on the ground.

Al Qaeda’s 1993 foiled "Day of Terror" plot in New York City offers another example of how all five components of the Threat Matrix combined and attempted a mass casualty series of simultaneous of attacks. The targets included the United Nations Headquarters, Lincoln Tunnel, Holland Tunnel, George Washington Bridge and a federal government building in Manhattan. American officials have always maintained that the blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman was the one who "inspired" the Islamists in the New York area. He had close ties with Egyptian terrorists responsible for the assassination of Anwar Saddat (these Egyptian-based terrorists have become very influential in al Qaeda). At the time of this conspiracy, Rahman had attained the role of spiritual leader of al Qaeda. A Muslim non-profit organization sponsored this radical cleric’s entry into the United States. Before his arrest, he used mosques in Brooklyn and New Jersey as bases from which to operate. Several of those arrested in the bomb plot were also veterans of the Afghanistan Jihad, including an American-Muslim. Sudanese officials played an integral role in the terror plot, not only by actively providing support for the perpetrators -- one of whom even bragged that Sudanese U.N. officials were going to provide credentials and a license plate that would allow for an explosives-packed vehicle to be parked at the U.N. Headquarters.

• December 1992: A bomb intended for U.S. servicemen en route to Somalia on a humanitarian mission explodes, killing two tourists in Yemen instead. Several terrorists were also captured while preparing to launch rockets at U.S. aircraft near Aden airport.
• February 26, 1993: A truck bomb detonates in parking garage of the World Trade Center, killing six. The terrorists hoped to collapse one tower into the other.
• June 1993: An attempt to assassinate Prince Abdullah of Jordan failed.
• June 23, 1993: Arrests are made in conspiracy to plant numerous bombs in New York City, including the Holland Tunnel, George Washington Bridge and the United Nations Headquarters. The plot became known as the "Day of Terror".
• June 25, 1993: Two CIA employees killed and three wounded in gun attack outside their headquarters in Virginia, the attack was initially believed to be random in nature.
• October 3-4, 1993: Al Qaeda operatives train and participate in attack on U.S. forces with Somali gunmen from Mohammed Farrah Aideed’s clan. Eighteen Americans were killed in the "Black Hawk Down" incident, as was a U.N. soldier and somewhere between 300 to 1,000 Somali gunmen.
• December 11, 1994: A "micro-bomb" explodes on a Philippines Airlines jet in mid-flight. The plane managed to land safely although one passenger was killed. This attack was a test for a plan to simultaneously bring down between 11 and 13 aircraft. A subsequent fire while making the bombs triggered an investigation by Filipino police, which foiled the operation.
• June 26, 1995: A suicide attack targeting Hosni Mubarak’s motorcade narrowly misses in Ethiopia.
• November 13, 1995: A car bomb explodes in front of building occupied by U.S. military in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Five Americans and two Indians are killed.
• June 26, 1996: A massive truck bomb explodes outside of the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. servicemen.
• November 17, 1997: Some 79 Western European tourists are massacred and hundreds wounded in grenade and machine gun attack in Luxor, Egypt.
• November 1997: Four American oil workers are killed in Pakistan.
• May 1998: European security services foil plot to mount a "spectacular" operation during World Cup soccer tournament in France.
• August 7, 1998: Two truck bombs explode simultaneously in front of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania killing over 250 people and wounding another 5,500.
• September 23, 1998: A bomb plot targeting U.S. embassy in Uganda is foiled, and 20 plotters are arrested.
• September 24, 1998: Security forces deploy in Germany over fears of an imminent attack on US consulate.
• January 19, 1999: Indian security forces thwart an operation to bomb U.S. embassy in New Delhi and consulates in Calcutta and Chennai.
• October 20, 1999: Turkish security forces capture two of eight suspects involved in attempt to attack conference on European Cooperation and Security.
• December 14, 1999: A plot to smuggle explosives and detonators from Canada to the U.S. is foiled. It is believed that these were to act as triggers for a number of larger bombs to be made from diesel oil and ammonium nitrate fertilizer.
• December 15, 1999: Jordanian authorities discovered another operation also timed to coincide with the millennium.
• December 19, 1999: Two men are arrested, including a Canadian, following the apparent discovery of explosive residue at a US border crossing.
• January 2000: A boat laden with explosives sinks while attempting a suicide operation against a US Navy vessel in a Yemeni port.
• February 2000: A plot to use Sarin nerve gas in an attack on the European Parliament is foiled.
• March 2000: President Clinton’s trip to Bangladesh is cancelled due to fears of an attack.
• October 5, 2000: The USS Cole is attacked by a boat packed with explosives while replenishing in a Yemeni port.
• December 28, 2000: German authorities arrest four terrorists, seizing cache of weapons and explosives.
• December 30, 2000: Five bombs explode in crowded locations in the Philippines, including one near U.S. Embassy, killing 22 and wounding over 100 others.
• December 24, 2000: Thirty churches in Indonesia are bombed on Christmas Eve, 18 people died and 82 were injured.
• July 2001: A plot to fly a helicopter into US embassy in France is uncovered.
• September 9, 2001: Two suicide bombers posing as journalists assassinate Ahmad Masood, leader of Northern Alliance, the main opposition force to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

• December 13, 2001: Five suicide terrorists armed with grenades and small arms storm the Indian Parliament, killing nine.
• January, 2002: Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl is kidnapped and killed in Pakistan.
• March 17, 2002: Grenades are thrown at a Christian school in Islamabad, Pakistan.
• April 11, 2001: A natural gas truck explodes outside the historic Ghirba synagogue in Tunisia, killing 15 people (including 12 German tourists) plus the attacker.
• October, 2002: Two American soldiers are killed during exercises in Kuwait after gunmen infiltrate their training area
• October, 2002: American diplomat assassinated in Jordan.
• October 3, 2002: A bomb explodes in Philippines killing four, including a Green Beret training Philippine security forces to operate against Islamists.
• October 6, 2002: A small craft laden with explosives rams a French oil tanker setting it ablaze near Yemen. Aden-Abyan Islamic Army claimed responsibility and also stated that original target was a U.S. warship, re-supplying vessels "...for striking the brothers in Iraq".
• October 13, 2002: Several bombs explode in Bali Indonesia killing nearly 200 Western tourists (mostly Australian) and Balinese Hindus, while wounding hundreds more.
• October 18, 2002: A suicide bomber kills 3 and injures 23 in explosion on bus in Manila, Philippines.
• November 21, 2002: Two American soldiers are shot and seriously injured in Kuwait.
• November 21, 2002: An American missionary is killed in Lebanon.
• November 27, 2002: A truck bomb detonates in the lobby of a hotel frequented by Jewish vacationers in Kenya, killing 12, plus 3 suicide bombers. In a related event, at least 2 missiles fired at Israeli passenger jet while taking off in Kenya. None managed to hit the aircraft.

Too narrow a focus will not succeed in defeating the current threat. If operations target only active al Qaeda cells there will not be any positive long term results: Their "legal" support infrastructures in the West will remain intact, awaiting orders while continuing to raise cash, recruits and political support; terrorist/insurgent organizations will continue to divert resources to the anti-Western Jihad; state sponsors may be tempted to resume their previous roles; and the fanaticized "Arab Afghans" will continue to act as the glue between components of the Threat Matrix, keeping it alive.

The Threat Matrix will continue to be a dynamic organization. It has a decentralized, multi-layered and multi-faceted set of relationships that allow numerous possibilities for hiding, regrouping and striking. As already mentioned, al Qaeda is morphing into a "virtual organization", mounting terrorist operations even without its infrastructure in Afghanistan.

Terrorist attacks will continue for the foreseeable future because the Threat Matrix is still a self-sustaining configuration. It will be innovative in its terrorist operations and will continue to look for vulnerable targets. Even after sustained Coalition operations in Afghanistan, intense pressure on al Qaeda’s state sponsors and the heightened alert that most of the world’s intelligence services have engaged in; terrorist operations were executed on several continents in October and November of 2002. The Bali bombing killed nearly 200 people; an explosive-laden boat rammed a French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen; and bomb and firearms attacks were orchestrated against American targets in Middle East and South Pacific, targeting an aid worker, diplomat and several others involving servicemen.

Al Qaeda will continue to attempt "spectacular" operations against Western/American targets. It appears that the events of October-November 2002 have failed to have their anticipated effect. Initially, the Islamists believed that small-scale operations after a "spectacular" attack (such as those of September 11) could have a devastating psychological impact upon the West. Instead, the public’s reaction was not to panic or go into shock.

Al Qaeda still has the ability to affect politics in vulnerable regions such as Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In late 2001, Islamist gunmen mounted an attack on the India Parliament. New Delhi responded by deploying troops along the Pakistani border, triggering fears of a renewed war in the sub-continent. Other regions where al Qaeda operatives maintain a presence (and consequently vulnerable to this type of destabilization) include the Philippines, North Africa, Pakistan/Afghanistan or even the Occupied Territories. Such operations divert Western assets and can trigger political, military and diplomatic chaos. Moreover, the threat of another attack whose lethality and destructiveness rivals that of 9-11 will always be real.

-- Joe Turlej.

The author has been associated with the Mackenzie Institute since 1995 and has made many important and insightful contributions to its work. However, the general expansion of intelligence capabilities since 2001 has had one baleful consequence for the Institute and a positive one for Mr. Turlej — he is now working in his dream job as an intelligence analyst with a major Canadian police force. Our loss is their gain, and our very best wishes go with him.

[Section 1] [Section 2] [Section 3]

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca