War, terrorism and Dentistry

by John Thompson

December 9, 2002

Ever have a tooth pulled? Without anesthetic? Fortunately, like warfare, this is an ordeal that few of us ever have to undergo, but if you must, it is best done quickly.

Warfare is ghastly, cruel, and horrible. However, like dentistry, it is sometimes necessary. As a result, Westerners don’t much like fighting wars, but if we must, we prefer them to be victorious, short, and inexpensive. Unfortunately, when engaging terrorists, there is no promise of victory, the situation might last for decades, and the costs are never cheap.

The perfect war was probably fought by the Royal Navy in 1896: The Sultan of Zanzibar decided to tell the British to sod off and let the Muslim city state return to its old ways (like exporting African slaves to the Middle East). The immediate result was a brisk half hour bombardment of the Sultan’s palace, whereupon the (im)potentate struck his colors and begged for peace. The Admiral commanding the naval squadron accepted his surrender and billed him for the ammunition his ships expended.

Three of the world’s leading military historians, Victor Davis Hanson, Martin van Crevald and John Keegan, have pointed out that the Western World has different concepts of warfare from the rest of the world. For a start, the Ancient Greeks became disliked protracted periods of raid and counter-raid, and the constant petty violence that was the hallmark of the warrior and his modern descendents, the guerrilla and the terrorists. Instead, the Greeks decided to decide issues quickly in deliberate and brutal battle. To achieve this, they turned their citizens from amateurish warriors into (during war) focused and disciplined soldiers.

The results of the Greek military revolution can be witnessed in their wars with the Persians, and such one-sided wipeouts as Marathon, Platea, or Cunaxa. The Romans and following European cultures picked up the Greek model with the net effect that Western armies have seldom been defeated in battle — except by each other. Our expertise in warfare has worked against us in that episodes like Waterloo, Gettysburg, the Somme or the Normandy summer of 1944 still haunt our memories and inhibit our willingness to go to war.

The second problem with Western expertise in battle is that non-Westerners have learned that, to avoid defeat, they should avoid battle until they hold all the cards. The British army that easily blew apart the hoards of Sudanese Mahdi fanatics in 1898 spent 20 years fruitlessly chasing the wasp-like band of the ‘Mad Mullah’ (Mohammed ben Abdullah) in Somalia. In Afghanistan and Vietnam, modern soldiers crushed their elusive warrior-opponents whenever they were foolish enough to concentrate; and plodded around fruitlessly when the Afghans and Vietnamese decided to avoid giving battle. Denied the chance to win victory, both the Soviets and Americans decided the game wasn’t worth the candle and left.

The rest of the world is quite aware of the savage lethality of Western forces in battle; they are also quite aware that we are terrified of ourselves when engaging in warfare; and know that as a result, we like victorious, short and inexpensive wars — especially those that go nowhere near our own homes and families. The result is that who would wage war on us now, do so through terrorism.

Terrorism goes right after our homes and families while preventing any chance of our winning a quick and crushing battle. Fighting against terrorism is also long and protracted. Groups like the IRA and the Basque ETA — both of whom could be crushed in days if the British or Spanish were prepared to be cruel — survived decades of efforts to contain them.

In the war against Al Qaeda, we confront an enemy that can hide anywhere, draws support from within every Muslim society, and ceaselessly searches out opportunities to deliver a cruel and petty attack while always denying a real target in response.

To fight them, we must appeal to the ‘hearts and minds’ of ordinary Muslims — except that we have already lost this campaign. We must cut them off from sources of arms and money, except that they have innumerable ways of acquiring more that we cannot touch. In the end, we are left with an attritional battle — in that we can only hope that they lose experienced and trained bomb-makers, gunmen and planners faster than they can replace them. Right now, this doesn’t look all that likely.

The war against Al Qaeda will not be cheap, it won’t be short, and unless we change the rules of conflict, it might not even be victorious. Prepare to get kicked in the teeth.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca