New Facets in Aviation Terrorism

by John Thompson

December 2, 2002

The November 28^th attack on an Israeli airliner with SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles is guaranteed to throw another kink in the global economy. As usual, one attack on one target puts all airliners and all those who travel in them all over the world.

Ever since Peruvian terrorists hijacked a Pan-Am mail plane in 1930, there have been almost 1,000 incidents of aviation-related terrorism. Hundreds of aircraft have been hijacked while dozens have been destroyed by bombs in flight. Until 2001, the most lethal single act of terrorism had been the 1985 Air India Bombing (which killed 329 people — including 154 Canadian citizens).

The use of four hijacked aircraft as piloted cruise missiles in the 9-11 attacks raised the bar on successful terrorism and killed some 3,200 people in less than two hours.

Airliners remain irresistible to terrorists. They are fragile and full of people — allowing more death for the dollar than almost any form of attack. If the terrorist wants to take hostages, an airliner is fairly easy to control once the formidable logistical hurdle of getting weapons on board is accomplished.

To terrorists, airlines symbolize countries — Air France represents France, El Al represents Israel, Pan Am represents America. When an Armenian group wanted to attack a Canadian target in 1980, they put a bomb in an Air Canada cargo facility in Los Angeles. Numerous groups have also firebombed ticket offices of various airliners since the late 1960s.

Over the years, Airliners have become better (though sadly imperfectly) protected against hijacking and onboard bombs. But if aircraft can be difficult to attack, airports have large concentrations of people — many of whom can be found in a line up in front of the ticket counter for a particular airliner. Massacre attacks with automatic weapons and hand grenades have occurred in airports in Israel and Rome, and last summer a self-acting terrorist took a pair of pistols to the El Al counter in Los Angeles and killed one person before being killed himself.

Added to these are high value attacks like the 2001 Tamil Tiger assault on the Colombo airfield that destroyed half the aircraft of Sri Lanka’s national airline, and caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage to the country’s economy. The IRA’s use of large home-made mortars fired at Heathrow and Gatwick airports shut down these vital commercial hubs for days. None of the mortar bombs did any real damage, but in terrorism the intent can count as much as the results.

The Mombassa attack with SAM-7s wasn’t the first use of shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles by terrorists. Two SAM-7s were scooped up in a Rome apartment in 1973; the apartment was occupied by terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and was under the flight path for Rome’s Airport. The IRA has some SAM-7s, but soon realized that their use would have resulted in scalp hunting by elite SAS commandos. These missiles have shot down propeller driven passenger planes in Africa.

SAM-7s pose a profound threat. The missile and launch unit are a little over a metre long and relatively light, so they are easy to smuggle. While more capable hand-held missiles like the American Stinger or British Javelin exist, SAM-7s were manufactured in the tens of thousands by the USSR and were widely distributed. China copied the Soviet design, while the missiles were also made under license in Egypt and Pakistan.

The SAM-7 Strella (Russian for ‘arrow’) is a simple weapon and a day of training should make anyone proficient with the weapon -- expertise is something else. Like most such weapons it is a passive heat-seeking missile. In contrast to sensitive ‘all aspect’ nature of Stingers, Javelins or SAM-16s that allow an attack on an aircraft from any angle, so long as the aircraft is warmer than the surrounding air, the SAM-7 must home in on a strong heat signature — and the exhaust of a jet engine is almost ideal. Fortunately, Strellas have been known to ignore chosen targets to home in on the sun, hot tin roofs, and other non-flying objects.

The defences against such a missile are few. With no radar or laser guidance, there is nothing to warn a pilot that his plane is under attack. Airliners don’t fly with wingmen and can’t practice evasive maneuvers. Military aircraft spit out flares to distract missiles in danger zones — something airliners can’t do over cities.

Last week’s attacks mean yet another dimension to the Al-Qaeda threat and present yet another threat to all of us.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca