Bioterrorism and our future

by John Thompson

August 12, 2002

Every coin has two sides, most swords have two edges; and right now we have two sets of choices about our future. If we make the wrong choices, we might not have one.

Change and innovation are coming at a dizzying pace--so much so that many of us have lost our sense of awe and wonder at our progress. In 1802, the industrial revolution was looming over the horizon; in 1902 the consumer age was lurching into view, and in 1952 the computer age was lurking around the corner. Now, in 2002, three distinct technological revolutions are drifting into sight with all the innocence of an iceberg in a major shipping lane.

Today, the biotechnology revolution is already well underway, the robotics revolution is just beginning; and the nanotechnology revolution (bringing an ability to rearrange molecules on an industrial scale) is coming within a generation. The promise these advances bring is staggering when one thinks of the possibilities that might be realized in this century. However, there are enormous risks when entire societies live in a climate of endemic technological tumult-- especially those that regard themselves as unsinkable or fail to keep a good look out.

Technology is mostly beneficial, but not always: Railways allowed us to banish famine (except when we choose otherwise); they also supplied armies of a size and power never imagined before. Nuclear power lights our cities, but the threat of nuclear weapons destroying our cities has hung over our heads for decades. Computers allow us to communicate in ways that were unimaginable a generation ago, but can guide weapons with incredible precision. All of our new advantages bring risks with them.

So will it be with the emerging technologies. But, while some thought should be given to the effect of robotics and Nanotechnology on warfare, the risk of biological warfare has just grown enormously. On July 11, a team of American scientists announced that they had manufactured--from basic chemicals and public references--living polioviruses. The project leader believes his students could replicate his two-year project in six months. There are enormous benefits to the new biotechnologies, but the risk that a terrorist group or unfriendly government could produce an enhanced super-virus is larger than ever.

Imagine something that is already ghastly like Ebola or the Bubonic Plague that is designed to be far more contagious, hardier, faster in reproduction and more resistant to antibiotics than anything nature has thrown at us. This threat is bad enough and will only grow worse. In a very few years it should become possible to have viruses target people by specific genes, and such a weapon could be created to hit a particular population. The attractiveness of such weapons will be overwhelming to the world’s malcontents and ambitious nations untroubled by scruples.

It is safe to say that the Western nations will not develop such weapons. First, we tend to abide by treaties and a lot of work has gone into getting other nations to sign onto the ban on biological warfare (although this is moot when the resources of governments are no longer necessary to create credible bioweaponry). More importantly, we have nothing to gain from developing such weapons--our citizens range the world and come from every race on it. In a world when gene-specific bioweaponry becomes common, we have the most to lose.

The threat of biowarfare by terrorists, insurgents and hostile governments is real and it is immediate. This genie is half-out of the bottle already and there is no way to stuff the cork back in. Worse still, aside from our passive defences, we have no real response to it.

Nuclear weapons were frightening and the development of two nuclear-armed superpowers was enough to keep this weapon tucked into its scabbard for over 50 years. But against the new biological threat, there will be no sure warning of an attack until the hospitals start filling up with thousands of stricken people; no sure knowledge of who is behind the attack without months of investigation; and no guarantee of balanced terror to keep these weapons from being used.

This last point is the most troubling. Passive defences (a vital public health system, lots of trained professionals and specialists, and a robust emergency measures system) are vital, but ultimately, all defences are vulnerable to failure. We need to start thinking about active responses and deterrence in an era when easy genocide comes into the grasp of anyone who hates enough to attempt it.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca