Newsletter: January, 01

Table of Contents:

[Emerging Weapons Technologies] [Yasser Arafat’s Saga of Mismanagement] [Terrorism and the New Century]

Editor’s Remarks

Herodotus tells the story of a Persian horse thief who had been condemned to execution by his king. The thief begged for clemency, telling his ruler that if his life was spared he would teach the monarch’s favorite horse how to sing. The king was amused by the thief’s offer and agreed on the condition that the thief had one year to succeed. If he failed, he would still be executed, but this time the manner of his death would be quite gruesome.

Later, in the Royal Stables, the thief’s friends remonstrated with him saying that the original sentence was bad enough, but the hideous form of execution a year later was no bargain at all. The thief smiled and told his friends "Who knows what might happen in a year? I might die, the king might die, and the horse might die. Besides, maybe the horse could learn how to sing."

Today, we spend a lot of time trying to teach horses how to sing. We expect the People’s Republic of China can learn to respect human rights (something with no basis in 4,000 years of China’s history), hope that the Palestinians and Israelis might learn to get along, and wish that prosperity and democracy could take root in Africa. At home, we expect human nature can be overcome with proper legislation and a little bit of gentle admonition. We run down our military in the belief we will never again face a major war, and let our infrastructure decay in the expectation that money must eventually fall from heaven.

Of course, it is always possible that a horse can someday learn to sing, but depending on it is a course for the most desperate of fools — or most contemporary liberal thinkers.

One hundred years ago, heavier-than-air powered flight was still in the theoretical stage and dirigibles looked more promising than the airplane. Automatic weaponry was — as John Ellis points out in The Social History of the Machine-gun — far from being embraced by the generals of Europe. The hand grenade and mortar were regarded as quaint 18^th Century relics, and the first diesel-electric submarine was just coming into service.

The motorcar was still a curiosity and the radio was untried. Steam engines and telegraphs ruled while Army officers practiced swordsmanship and equestrian skills. A few pioneering science-fiction writers had hinted at future possibilities: Jules Verne anticipated the nuclear propelled submarine and the first moon shot, while H.G. Wells ruminated about land-battleships.

Yet some of the results of emerging technologies could be guessed at; and one guess was very accurate indeed. In 1898, a Polish railway official predicted the tactical deadlock that governed the First World War. Naturally, being a civilian and civil servant, Ivan Bloch’s gloomy predictions in Modern Weapons and Modern War were almost universally ignored.

By 2001, we have finally learned that conventional armies cannot engage each other without considerable expense in lives and material to both — unless one side is a full technological jump ahead of the other. The thrashing received by the Iraqis in the 1991 Gulf War illustrated the dangers involved when a military with the equipment and techniques of the mid-1970s confronted one that was up-to-date. More recently, during the Kosovo bombings, had Serbia’s Army acted in any manner but that of a woodchuck under the shadow of a hawk, it would have been savaged by NATO war-planes. As it was, Serbia’s economic infrastructure was cheaply and efficiently wrecked.

Should two militaries with the same level of technology confront each other again, the results would be horrifying. Indeed, the concentrated combination of modern firepower in an atmosphere of super-rapid decision-making and information saturation might be beyond the endurance of most human beings. Richard Gabriel’s 1987 book No More Heroes predicted that soldiers in such a conflict would need to be kept under the influence of mind/mood altering drugs in order to function.

In a simple sense, militaries adapt technology to firepower, mobility, protection and what is called C³I — command, control, communications and intelligence. A Marxist dialectic could be applied to the relationship between method (tactics, operations and strategy) and technology, where a new technology is developed to meet a need in method. This then creates a new synthesis of technology and method. This is a simple explanation for a very complex process.

One could suppose that much of what transpired in warfare was inevitable in 1901. Militaries love firepower (usually) and were quick to adapt new developments from the Industrial Revolution. The magazine-fed breech loading rifle and the machine-gun had provided a significant advantage in dealing with non-Europeans and were adopted relatively quickly — although the conservative armies of the time were loath to consider what these developments in firepower would do when modern armies clashed. The competition between European nations also prompted a race in artillery technology, culminating in the first "modern" artillery pieces with hydro-pneumatic recoil systems and reliable time fuses for shells.

Bloch’s prediction about the firepower revolution were right — and the first half of the First World War resulted in immense carnage as all the contenders tried to find a way around the impasse caused by these new weapons. Method, however, can evolve too, and some Armies of 1917-18 did overcome the impasse. One book that describes British innovation in this period is Paddy Griffith’s excellent study Battle Tactics of the Western Front. By 1918, trench-lines had become more of a speed bump than a barrier to the British and Germans.

Part of the 1914-16 impasse in the trenches was a result of the failure of mobility and C³I technologies to keep pace with the new firepower. Attackers could not reinforce success over cratered fields and roads as quickly as defenders could prop up failure with intact roads and rail-lines in their rear. New developments during the Great War matured in its aftermath, and culminated in technology and methods used in 1939-45. One should remember that "Blitzkrieg" was little more than the successful methods of WW-I mixed with reliable vehicles, effective aircraft and workable radios.

In 1901, while Bloch foresaw the results of the firepower revolution, a truly foresighted individual might have guessed that aircraft, radios and weapons like tanks and trucks would soon follow.

In the latter half of the 20^th Century, there were two developments. First, the physicists of the 1890s to 1910s, had eventually made possible the nuclear bomb and ballistic missile. For 50 years, these inhibited prospects for major wars like those that dominated the early 20^th Century. This then led to a "two-track" method of warfare — limited conventional wars between nation states, and a return to alternative forms of warfare by those who could not afford to invest in the costly new militaries.

Additionally, the Western Europeans and Americans grasped the need that they should always be at least one technological step ahead of potential opponents — particularly the USSR. The resulting arms race was clearly won by the Western Allies when the Soviets fell off the pace and expired on the track. This left Western militaries — even under-funded as they all are — in a position of clear superiority at the end of the Century.

Strategic mobility has been enhanced by giant transport aircraft like the American C-5A Galaxy, while no commander in history has enjoyed the tactical speed possessed by air-assault units. The capability of Western firepower is unrivaled: They can destroy whatever they hit, and hit whatever they see, and can see almost everything. The capabilities of modern C³I are almost beyond the comprehension of anyone who served in any earlier military.

At the dawn of the 21^st Century, one might wonder what changes will come.

The next three technological revolutions are already visible. Sweeping developments are underway in the biosciences, particularly with genetic engineering. These naturally were driven by needs in medicine, agriculture and industry, but all human technologies have military applications. The most frightening possibilities lie with a new range of biological weapons — although their classification as weapons of mass destruction should (please God) inhibit their use by nation states. It would be a real miracle if non-state belligerents also refrained from their use.

Other possible applications have been suggested by the fecund imaginations of science-fiction writers. Some suggestions include designed or altered soldiers who are significantly stronger, faster, smarter and more violent than man in his natural state. Other predictions include the use of new pharmaceuticals (which now seem very possible indeed) to inhibit some normal human reactions to fear or stress; and perhaps the use of enhanced animals to partner human soldiers. None of these would be especially revolutionary, but may have specialist applications, particularly in low-intensity conflict. Otherwise, military surgeons will benefit from improved medical technologies as much as anybody will.

What seems much more applicable is the coming boom in robotics. Already used to smart weapons that are largely self-guiding or the complex feed of data that goes to warplane pilots in their cockpits, Western militaries are now inching towards more remote-controlled weapons (perhaps through cybernetic links to well-protected humans) and completely robotic systems. The next generation of warplanes to follow the FA-22 Raptor might not have pilots in cockpits. The next generation of anti-tank mines may scuttle around on their own to look for targets. Successors to police bomb-squad robots could include SWAT-robots that go into close contact with gunmen while their controller sits some blocks away. One system in development consists of humming-bird sized reconnaissance drones that can fly around corners or look into windows, while the tank or infantry section that released them sits safely under cover — viewing the "take" from the drone’s camera.

In some senses, one is reminded of the militaries of 1901 that enhanced their firepower without thinking about all the implications. A war in 2014-2018 or 2039-2045 that pitted two cybernetic-robotic equipped militaries against each other could be a sour one indeed. Humans would be reduced to little more than victims, for there is no heroism in servicing a machine, and no capacity for mercy or empathy in a robot. Most humans have limitations on their capacity to inflict violence, but machines would have no scruples at all.

One can imagine a vast dead wasteland prowled by small deadly machines while their controllers sit in bunkers, in constant fear of discovery. Alternatively, one could imagine a war that seems like no war at all… as the deadly accuracy of modern weaponry is applied with utter discrimination, and a civilian population might live almost normal lives as a remote-controlled conflict weaves in and around them.

The third revolution looming over the horizon is even more interesting. Nanotechnology was a purely hypothetical concept ten years ago. In 1950, the laser was still hypothetical — and then three separate scientific projects built them in 1960. By 1970, the first laser-guided munitions were in use; by 1985, lasers were becoming useful in medical applications and by 1990, CD discs were common for home entertainment. In 2000, nanotechnology started to pass from the hypothetical to the actual.

Nanotechnology entails the use of molecule-sized components and tools to re-assemble other things on a molecular scale. Soon, there will be self-replicating "nanobots" that are a millionth of a metre in size, working on a number of interesting applications — like converting a lump of coal into a flawless diamond, one molecule at a time. Already, a promising new material has been produced — a carbon honeycomb structure that is 50 times stronger than steel — at 1/300^th of the weight.

Nanotechnology will change the world in more ways than the industrial revolution and the introduction of the computer combined. Some of the peaceful applications alone can stagger the mind: computer (screens and keyboards too) literally thinner than a piece of paper, or unbreakable sheets of diamond that are almost as cheap as glass is today. One could convert grass-clippings into gasoline or use nanobots to rebuild damaged tissue inside organs.

The reverse side is frightening: Nanotech "dis-assembler" weapons could do more than the Neutron bomb ever promised to kill people while leaving buildings intact. Being dismantled one molecule at a time would be a horrific way to die. One could also imagine dis-assembler weapons that force a return to older technologies (like swords and chain mail) as anything with an electronic or explosive component to it could be destroyed by microscopic virus-like robots.

Warfare is a constant in history, and will no doubt attend the future. There is no reason to suspect that the military history of the 21^st Century will be a thin volume, but it should be a fascinating — if disturbing — study.

Yasser Arafat would be a welcome addition to any poker game, for the Palestinian leader has an impulsive urge for trying to take the pot with a pair of fours and a lot of bluff. Unfortunately, the poker games he deals himself into employ human lives as chips.

Arafat has been around as a leader of the Palestinians for a long time — long enough for many contemporary politicians to forget much about his career. For all the promise of the 1994 Norwegian initiative between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, it has been easy to neglect the lessons that might be learned from his past performance.

The Palestinian Arabs have grievances, many of which can be justly blamed on the Israelis. The latter wanted their own state and having seen over half of their coreligionists in Europe murdered by the Nazis, were in no mood to tolerate opposition. A nation built by dispossessed refugees created another wave of dispossessed refugees — although the finger pointing for specific blame rightly goes to all parties in the 1947-48 conflict including the Palestinians themselves.

Regardless of who was at fault for the creation (and continuation) of the Palestinian Refugee problem, they did present a continuing threat to the security of Israel, especially after the second wave of displacements were generated as Israel overran the West Bank in the 1967 War.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was created as a result of the 1964 Arab Summit Conference. It was intended to represent all Palestinian Arabs, and to function as a Leftist-Secular body aimed at the defeat of Israel. Yasser Arafat became the leader of the organization in 1969 as it turned into an umbrella group for almost all Palestinian factions.

The PLO, like its many subordinate and splinter groups, was quick to turn to "revolutionary" violence to achieve its manifold goals. They wanted to strike back at Israel, bring global attention to themselves and their cause, and further the overall campaign of instability aimed (through proxies) by the USSR at the Western World. The PLO, especially in its early days, was an avid ally and supporter of any number of would-be revolutionaries.

Joining this campaign was Arafat’s first mistake, although it might be argued that he had no choice. The PLO needed money and arms, and these were most available from the Soviet Bloc for those who were prepared to be "progressive" combatants. Terrorism and Soviet sponsorship might have looked like a dependable tactic in the heady days of 1969-70, and very few people were all that certain of the inevitable collapse of the Soviet Union. The PLO’s first mistake was an easy one to make in those days, and too many other people made it as well.

One important lesson that most humans learn is never to soil one’s own bed. In 1948 and again in 1967, most Palestinian refugees went to Jordan; where they significantly changed the Kingdom’s population mix. Jordan’s 1950 Annexation of the West Bank Palestinian communities did not help matters either — nor did King Hussein’s frequent departures from the Egyptian-Iraqi-Syrian "party line" on Israel.

The aftermath of the Six Day War in 1967 intensified Jordan’s problems, particularly as the emerging PLO became increasingly truculent about openly carrying arms in Jordan, and in their opinions of its King. Arafat grew aggressive, seemingly emboldened by the new friends the PLO was attracting and refused to back down. In February, June and September of 1970, the Jordanian Army moved against the armed "commandos" of the PLO and the last round of fighting in June of 1971 resulted in their expulsion. In these cycles of "jaw-jaw, war-war" Arafat always misread his support and constantly assumed his position was stronger than it actually was.

Jordan’s new stability came at the expense of Lebanon (and it is perhaps significant that none of Israel’s main trio of enemies cared to host the PLO). Lebanon was the weakest of Israel’s neighbours and already had problems with the armed Palestinian groups that were proliferating in the late 1960s. Fighting occurred in 1969 and again in 1973, as Syria continued to funnel the PLO’s fighters through its own territory into Lebanon.

Lebanon was a multicultural state ever since it emerged in 1945. The Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shi’ia Muslims were in an uneasy balance, along with the additional presence of Druze, pro-Syrian factions and others. The large influx of Palestinians threw off the balance, particularly as Arafat continued to run the PLO as a state-within a state and to launch raids against Israel.

By April of 1975, the Lebanese Civil War began — a complex conflict that is still far from over in many respects. During the course of the War, the PLO started to build up an even larger conventional force armed with Soviet supplied armour and artillery. These were also used to attack Christian forces. In response to the PLO build-up, Israel invaded in 1982, crushing the Syrians and PLO forces they engaged. It is one of the many strange facets of this war that the Israelis were initially much welcomed as liberators by the Shi’ia. Indeed, the Shi’ia only soured on the Israelis when the latter settled in to keep an eye on their remaining opponents— and this provoked a war that still continues.

As a part of the negotiations to end this conflict, the PLO — whose leadership and remaining forces were trapped in Beruit — agreed to be disarmed and to leave Lebanon. This departure became urgent after Christian Phalangists, irked by the PLO murders of many of their own people, took the opportunity to repay the Palestinians in their own coin in September of 1982, during two massacres in refugee camps.

Upon departing Lebanon, Arafat and the PLO arrived in Tunisia, where their new hosts ensured that the disarmament process had been complete. Arafat’s two attempts to establish a regional power base and a standing military had been crushed, but he tried to stay in the game. As the 1980s wore on, the PLO’s finances and influence dwindled although Arafat twice attempted to present himself as a negotiator, particularly after his own bodyguards hijacked the cruise-liner Achille Lauro (and murdered a wheelchair bound American passenger).

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Arafat once more attempted to ease his way into the limelight… simultaneously offering his own services in brokering an end to the crisis while also endorsing Saddam Hussein. To the oil-rich Gulf nations who provided much of the PLO’s funding, this was the last straw, and the end of the 1991 Gulf War left Arafat’s finances and reputation at low ebb.

Worse, the West Bank Palestinians had been busy winning a measure of success without Arafat’s help. The Intifada had succeeded in blackening Israel’s reputation in a way the PLO had never managed, primarily by pitting teenagers with slingshots against riflemen. Moreover, Muslim fundamentalist Palestinians now led the terrorist fight against Israel; and their ideology was totally opposed to the socialist-secular notions that Arafat had represented for decades.

Enter the Americans and the Norwegians. Convinced that Middle Eastern stability rested on a Palestinian/Israeli rapprochement, the Oslo Accord triggered a new round of agreements (and as many unresolved disagreements). Part of the process allowed for a limited degree of autonomy for the West Bank Palestinians, and Arafat returned home to assume his role as leader.

Peace will not thrive when wedged between two stubborn stiff-necked peoples. The Israelis, whose boisterous democracy is backstopped by a well-learned reluctance to trust in the forbearance of any potential enemy, are understandably slow to yield concessions to Arafat. For his part, Arafat has displayed all the corruption and cronyism that the world has come to expect of socialist revolutionaries who form governments. Additionally, he has been unable to refrain from working to acquire all the trappings of a nation state and once again creating a military of his own. The 1995 Agreement restricts armed Palestinian Forces to police units alone, but no one doubts that they are the seed for a regular military.

Throughout the latter half of 2000, violence has been a regular occurrence in the West Bank communities and over 450 people have lost their lives. However, it is only the Israelis who have been pointing out that Arafat has resorted to his old tactic of instigating violence with one hand and offering to negotiate a resolution to it with the other. The old proverb that a Leopard cannot change its spots holds true… and the leaders of Europe and America who insist Israel should hug the PLO to its breast are not the people who will be disemboweled by it.

Terrorism is probably as old as civilization itself. Although the subject escapes easy definition, most people recognize it wherever a clandestine group uses deliberate violence as a public psychological tool for political purposes.

These characteristics of deliberate violence, a public psychological methodology, political purposes and clandestine organization (meaning it is undertaken by at least two persons acting in concert) provide the difference between terrorism and other forms of violence. Terror itself has been used as a weapon of war by warriors, and as an instrument of statecraft by rulers -- but is no more acceptable in its use by these than it is when used by a small cadre of insurgents.

The ancient antecedents to modern terrorism appear among the Sicarii of Christ’s time. The Greeks and the Romans were familiar with political terror in its three forms, including that of small group terrorism.

Terrorism seems more prevalent in those states where a plurality of opinion is necessary to govern. In a hierarchical medieval society, the terrorist was largely restricted in choice of targets to an elite and well-guarded few. While the assassin (who derives his name from a terrorist sect) and the coup-plotter have a long and detailed history, the terrorist is a rare-bird until parliaments appeared and middle-class opinion became important in the late 18th Century.

In the 20th Century, from start to finish, terrorism mostly occurred in free societies (from parliamentary monarchies to full democracies). It remains rare elsewhere and was almost entirely absent among the totalitarian states. So long as the rule of law, individual freedoms and responsible government persist, the terrorist will be present: But the particulars of terrorism itself will be subject to much change.

A persistent feature of terrorism is that of the imbalanced relationship between the terrorist and the authorities he opposes. The terrorist usually has few resources (sometimes nothing more than what can assembled on a workbench in a garage or basement), while the state has the police, military and considerable wealth. However, the state has two handicaps that do not trouble the terrorist.

Firstly, the terrorist has no end of potential targets, and even a failed attack can carry the same (or even more) emotional weight as a successful attack. Moreover, the purpose of terror is terror: One bombed shop means thousands of shop-owners and tens of thousands of shoppers will be apprehensive about the next attack. Few other forms of violence yield such a large return for such a tiny investment of effort -- another reason why terrorism will continue.

For their part, the authorities that confront terrorism must pursue a tiny handful of targets; all of whom can be difficult to identify, let alone find. Moreover, the reason why terrorism is most frequent in free societies is that the authorities are under constraint by things like Habeas Corpus, rules of evidence, presumption of innocence and all the other necessary rights that protect all individuals from abuse by the state. While terrorists are free to act without restraint, this certainly should not apply to those who pursue them.

Indeed, police and intelligence agencies that are engaged in counter-terrorism need to be subject to the most careful scrutiny. If the terrorist is especially dangerous or exceptionally outrageous, the rules may be bent or suspended -- but this is always hazardous. Friedrich Nietzsche warned "Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster." Worse still, the terrorist often hopes that the authorities will become monsters and hopes to provoke this.

However, this asymmetric relationship may be changing again... against the insurgent.

Since 1970, the computer has wrought the information and communication revolutions. The availability of information and the ability to analyze it have increased by many orders of magnitude as processors double in capacity and power every 18 months. Developments like parallel processing and new techniques in mathematical modeling add even more capabilities. Among other things, signals intelligence (Sig-Int) has become far more powerful and intrusive then ever before.

It is theoretically possible for any conversation by telephone, cell-phone, satellite phone or over the internet to be monitored by Sig-Int organizations -- even if encrypted. Yet at some point a human being needs to assess the "take" from intercepts and with billions of messages passing through the ether every day, there is no chance for a few thousands of people to notice most of it. However, if somebody has attracted the attention of the US or its major allies, it may eventually become impossible for them to safely communicate with distant colleagues.

Hollywood thrillers about the ability of the authorities to track suspects by camera and view them through walls are not far removed from the coming reality. In some locales, it is already possible to continually monitor one individual as he moves about. A number of countries are equipping entry points with devices that scan through vehicles or clothing to look for concealed objects. As the ability to feed computers from remote sensors over the Internet increases, movie thrillers may soon become all too real.

Other emerging technologies include tracking particular persons by the individual characteristics of their bio-electric fields, or perhaps by specific DNA markers in their sweat or on flakes of dead skin.

Yet all is not lost for the terrorist. For a start, the Internet gives him more intelligence than ever before, more supporters to draw comfort or assurance from, and allows techniques to be shared. This last point is important too… for the terrorist will have to increasingly rely on his own resources if he hopes to remain at large. While a terrorist may have many sympathizers, he will grow unable to capitalize on it. This, eventually, will leave him with little in his armory but improvised or homemade weaponry.

However, the potential damage that a terrorist might accomplish is going to increase at an astounding rate. Already, the pipe bomb and car bomb have given way to the truck bombs used in so many devastating attacks in the 1990s. Yet the deadliest potential for the terrorist may be outside the realm of conventional explosives. A skilled hacker could theoretically re-route trains and aircraft and so imperil thousands; more and more potential terrorists will be able to develop the necessary skills and have access to the equipment needed for such acts.

The emerging revolutions in biotechnology, robotics, and ultimately in nanotechnology (see "Emerging Weapons Technologies" above), will add significantly to the terrorist’s potential arsenals. As these technologies mature, they will become increasingly de-centralized in origin and more widespread in application. As a result, some terrorists will be able to develop and use them as weapons. While few attacks might succeed, these few successes that will let the many failures become terrifying in their own way.

At the start of the new century, it seems safe to predict that terrorism will continue, but that the terrorist will find it increasingly hard to function in any sort of organization above that of a small autonomous group. In compensation for this, he might be able to deliver attacks that made the truck-bombers of the 1990s look like small fry.

John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca