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Can Islam Cope with Modernity?

January, 1998

Westerners have rarely understood Islam. Attempts to describe it are normally done in the school of thought typified by Rousseau, wherein other peoples are assumed to have the virtues that the writer believes his own lack. There are profound differences between Western and Islamic thought, between perceptions of institutions, and understandings about the basis of society.

At that basic level of truth which is never exact, Western civilization is only built in part on religion. Judeo-Christian morality underlies Western political, legal and social structures, but Christ's distinction between the authorities of God and Caesar have generally kept Church and State in different spheres. In Islam, no such difference exists. Church and state are inseparable and Muslim concepts of what is meant by these are also completely different from those held by Westerners.

Islam is a complete ideology, which, like Marxism, begs for totalitarianism. Both are intended to be a complete design for a final society for all of humanity. The Quran is a social rule book, which was expanded upon and interpreted by law and commentary in the first few centuries after the Hegira. By about 900 AD, the process was complete and Islam has not been allowed to change much since then. As a design for life in a medieval society, Islam is fine. As a blueprint for life in the modern era, structural stresses are appearing.

In Islam, the individual must submit to the will of God as expressed in the Quran and interpreted by the clergy. Necessarily, this leaves little room for reform or flexibility. For those societies that do attempt a major change, reformers must cede the moral high ground to opponents with a ready-made conservative ideology. Once widespread dissatisfaction with a ruler exists, opponents invariably hoist the Green Flag and topple him on religious grounds for not being a good Muslim.

The rule of law -- so essential to Western societies -- finds shallow soil in Islamic nations. It is not that the law must invariably come in second to the rule of religion, but rather that religion and law are the same. The concept of individual rights in an Islamic society is well advanced -- if one is a Muslim male who chooses never to question the tenets of the faith. Women and non-Muslims remain perpetually disadvantaged, even today. A Muslim who is deemed to have deserted the faith is an apostate who must be destroyed. Admittedly, even an organization like the Taliban in Afghanistan can be seen to be sometimes tolerant of non-Muslims, so long as they keep their place.

The Islamic world is struggling to cope with modern technology and Western notions of human rights and democracy. The strengths of Western civilization are well recognized, particularly after the easy imposition of colonial rule in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. Some things are even easily grasped. Iran, for example, has no trouble adjusting to the use of mass media to convey the precepts of its revolution. It also has no problem sending off its young men for training in modern physics, engineering and micro-biology. The Iranian military, like those of other Islamic nations, is eager to accept modern weaponry and to pursue the development of chemical, biological and nuclear arms.

One should also remember that for many centuries Islam's accomplishments in the arts and sciences far exceeded those of Europe. Ibn Warriq, however, points out that these accomplishments owe little to the original crusaders of Islam -- but rather rest with the cosmopolitan nature of the early Caliphates. Once Islam fully asserted itself on the populations of its conquered territories, its inherent arch-conservatism led to widespread stagnation.

The full panoply of modernity is hard to accept. Successful democratic models in the Islamic World are few and far between. Pakistan hasn't been too stable, and the generals have ruled more often than not. Lebanon functioned briefly -- and provided a clear warning of the dangers of a multicultural political structure. Iran, while using mass media to foster the revolution, is extremely resistant to the idea of letting its citizens have full access to the global media.

Islam is troubled by the conflict between secularism (which Kemal Ataturk realized was essential for modern life) and traditionalists in every Islamic nation. The Turkish experiment has seldom been easy -- or widely replicated. Many Muslim leaders turned to homegrown combinations of nationalism, socialism and militarism. This has yielded a variety of interesting results ranging from the Algerian Junta to Colonel Qhadafi and Saddam Hussein; while Egypt and Tunisia seem to be hanging on to a degree of stability. All of these societies, of course, have an armed Fundamentalist opposition.

Interestingly, Tunisia has the greatest tolerance for diverse political expression, and its fundamentalist Muslim movement has largely confined itself to peaceful expressions of protest. Qhadafi's effort to reconcile Islam with national-socialism inevitably lead to compromises in Islamic doctrine, and these have helped create a new internal opposition.

All of these Modernist/Secularist traditions have little depth. Moreover, they have proven remarkably susceptible to corruption and single-party rule, even in their most benign forms.

The doctrines of Islamic law cannot change, or rather, cannot be allowed to change. A basic tenant of Islam is that it is a perfect design for a final society. Ergo, there is no room for real diversity of opinion. The freedom of women and non-Muslims can never be guaranteed either. Indeed, a Muslim living in a non-Muslim society can be reasonably interpreted to be at risk until such time as he is governed by proper Islamic institutions.

Any political, legal or social structure or reform that could not withstand a challenge from orthodoxy is built on sand and cannot last. Freedom of expression and open intellectual inquiry are likewise limited -- notwithstanding the art, philosophy and science that has appeared during occasional permissive periods.

This basic conflict between religious ultra-conservatism and illiberal forms of secularism will continue to divide every Islamic nation. It will continue to generate resentment against the West for generating new technologies and forcing new notions. The only alternative is for a new school of Islamic scholars to completely reinvent their religion --- and this would only add a new dimension to the internal conflict.

The Islamic world will know little peace in coming decades. Indeed, it knows very little now, and its internal frustrations have already been projected outwards. More will come.


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This article was heavily influenced by two books -- Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (Oxford University Press, 1993) and the extremely courageous work by Ibn Warriq Why I am not a Muslim (Prometheus Books, 1995).

"Muslims are the first victims of Islam. Many times I have observed in my travels in the Orient that fanaticism comes from a small number of dangerous men who maintain the others in the practice of religion by terror. To liberate the Muslim from his religion is the best service one can render him."
- E. Renan (as quoted in the frontspiece of Why I am not a Muslim)

"Christianity and Buddhism are primarily personal religions, with mystical doctrines and a love of contemplation. Mohammedanism and Bolshevism are practical, social, unspiritual, concerned to win the empire of this world."
- Bertrand Russell, Theory and Practice of Bolshevism, London 1921

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