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Sin-Tax Failure: The Market in Contraband Tobacco and Public Safety

Table of Contents:

[An Introduction to the Black Market] [The Size of the Market] [The Engine of Growth] [The Trail of Contraband] [The Native Dimension] [Other Native Involvement in Contraband] [The Warrior’s Society and the Black Market] [Other Dimensions of Violence] [Guns in Canadian Cities] [Organized Crime] [Countering the Black Market] [The High-Price, High-Tax Strategy] [Reducing the Contraband Market]

Chapter Three

The Engine of Growth

The main engine of the contraband market is taxation. Canada’s federal and provincial governments are revenue-hungry, particularly as all of them strayed into the quagmire of deficit spending. Tax rates have climbed steadily through the1980s, as budget-after-budget increased surtaxes, sales taxes, excise duties and sin taxes. These latter duties have been hard to resist, given increasing public disapproval of smoking and drinking. In recent years, arguments about the health effects of alcohol and tobacco have been pressed into service to justify the sin taxes and imply that they help fund health care programs.

Special-interest groups supported the tax hikes as they believe consumers could be induced to change their ways by hiking prices. This is a form of social-engineering and as such tends to be greatly resented by many Canadians, despite the valid points of groups such as the Canadian Cancer Society. Moreover, in Canada, during the 1980s, the savvy lobbyist and the articulate representative of special-interest group had access to the makers of policy — the average smoker and drinker did not. Predictably, the consumer is being heard from now. In their own quiet way and through the mechanism of the market, the inarticulate consumers are staging a tax revolt.

In 1980-81, the federal government collected $811 million in tobacco taxes. In 1990-91, Ottawa collected $2,250 million in taxes (with smuggling already underway and a steady decline in consumption through the 1980s). Provincial taxes increased during that time by an average rate of 18.1%, federal taxes increased by 18.7%. Most of the increases took effect after 1987. Taxes on a carton of cigarettes (200 cigarettes) went from an average of $16.72 to $35.89 from 1987 to 1993. Taxes on alcohol have not been as onerous, but the growth in bootlegged alcohol speaks for itself.

A pack-a-day smoker in 1993 paid an additional $1,638.38 in taxes. Some may argue that this is an acceptable premium to pay against the higher risk of lung cancer or heart disease: Perhaps it is. But more and more Canadians refuse to pay that premium.

Taxes in the US have been lighter for various reasons. These include larger populations and an electorate which is less willing to tolerate high taxes. Given the comparison between American and Canadian prices for cigarettes, the emergence of a widespread Canadian contraband trade in tobacco was inevitable.

The following compares fully taxed tobacco prices in various Canadian provinces and American border states as of December 1992. All prices are in Canadian currency, marked as the sales cost of a cigarette in cents for comparison purposes. The prices were checked against Contraband Tobacco Estimate

 

 

Price per Cigarette (Cents Canadian)

Newfoundland

26.9

Maine

9.1

Nova Scotia

25.3

Maine

9.1

New Brunswick

26.0

Maine

9.1

PEI

25.5

Maine

9.1

Quebec

25.0

Vermont

9.7

Ontario

24.4

New York

12.0

Manitoba

25.9

Minnesota

12.1

Saskatchewan

26.1

North Dakota

10.9

Alberta

23.2

Montana

10.1

British Columbia

27.0

Washington

11.5

Cost of production = 4.6 to 7.9 cents.

Lower American taxes on cigarettes are attractive, but un-taxed prices are even better. Some of the contraband market in tobacco utilizes tax-free products which come from duty-free shops, but most pass through the hands of native peoples who enjoy un-taxed status.

The price-spread for the same carton of 200 Canadian cigarettes can vary as follows (all figures in Canadian funds):

49.00 Ontario, full provincial and federal taxes

25.55 New York, with full state and federal taxes

21.99 Canada, duty free shops

18.28 New York, duty free shops

15.72 Native Reserves

Buying ten cartons of cigarettes in a New York convenience store can save $194.50 for a Canadian smoker. Buying the same amount on a Reserve can save $292.80. Re-selling these cartons with a profit margin which matches ordinary New York prices yields a gross profit of $101.70. This price difference is what has created and defined the contraband market in tobacco. The price difference in liquor and other alcohol products is not quite as marked, but it is enough to develop a bootlegging industry. Andrew Brandt, the CEO of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, testified about bootlegging to the Ontario Legislature’s Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs in November. He cited several examples of major incidents in 1993. These included:

 

    • March, 6,500 cases of smuggled liquor were found in a Barrie warehouse and in two trailers in Orillia, the shipment was worth $1.7 million
    • May, police in Buffalo raided a warehouse and confiscated $100,000 in alcohol headed for Toronto. Some was already loaded in vans with Ontario plates.
    • July, the OPP stopped a tractor-trailer with 360 cases near Fort Erie; this shipment was worth $80,000.
    • July, Metro Toronto Police raided food stores and seized 4,200 bottles of Chinese Liquor worth $63,000.
    • November, three Canadians and an American were charged with planning to smuggle 1,700 cases of liquor into Canada.
    • November, the LCBO enforcement staff seized 30,000 bottles of Chinese spirits worth $350,000.

The effect of the tobacco price difference should have been predicted — the contraband flooding across the US border into Canada uses the same routes over which alcohol was often smuggled in the United States during the Prohibition Era. There are a number of other parallels between the Era and the current Canadian situation which bear examination.

The abuse of alcohol in 19th Century America was widespread and caused a number of social ills. Low production standards led to many health problems as unscrupulous distillers laced their alcohol with strychnine, cayenne pepper or gunpowder to add "kick" to it. Public drunkenness among rural workers on visits to town (cowboys, lumberjacks and sailors for example) was matched by the heavy consumption of factory workers seeking temporary oblivion in grim industrial towns. Alcohol often formed a part of the daily diet. Not surprisingly, teetotaller and temperance movements grew in size as the century passed. As always, there were the social crusaders who, in fighting a particular evil, seek total victory. Vocal temperance preachers or the legendary saloon wrecker Carey Nation, provided colour to the Abolition Movement, but its strength was based in the thousands of educated middle class campaigners who formed a powerful lobby.

The Abolition Movement took advantage of the First World War and its attendant sense of a national effort to push the passage of the Volstead Act. The 18th Amendment to the US Constitution passed in January 1919 and the Prohibition Era began. This was repealed in late 1933 by the 21st Amendment. As an exercise in a social-engineering, Prohibition had one success: The worst excesses of alcohol abuse were partly curtailed and public drunkenness has never been as endemic, nor as tolerated as it once was. American Drinking habits did change as a result of Prohibition.

The demand for alcohol continued throughout Prohibition in the United States. Many citizens resented the legislation and defied it by drinking when they felt like it. However, the only sources of alcohol were illegal. Moonshine and "bathtub gin" met some of the demand — albeit at risk to the consumer as some products were hazardous as the cheap "rotgut" spirits of the 19th Century. Safe or quality alcohol was only available from smugglers (ironically, Canada was a major supply source) or those with the wherewithal to clandestinely produce large volumes inside the United States. As a result, the whole experiment led to the unparalleled growth of organized crime.

The major US criminal elements in 1919 were based on gangs in the Irish, Italian and Jewish communities. They ran extortion rackets and engaged in petty theft while usually preying on their own communities. What would become the Mafia consisted of dozens of gangs under the leadership of the "Mustache Petes". Prohibition provided easy money and opportunities-especially for those who unified to control the market in various cities. Vicious gang wars marked the early part of the era, but conflict in the latter half was decided by efforts to stem the growing political power of some of the gangs. This was largely gained through political corruption and intimidation. The struggle between the Treasury Agent Elliot Ness and mobster Al Capone was the most famous, and the 1955 book The Untouchables is a frightening account of how serious the problem was in Chicago.

The repeal of Prohibition acknowledged the failure of the Volstead Act to curtail American drinking and the growing power of the mobs. The Mafia (which had either eliminated or absorbed its rivals) had evolved during 14 years of the Prohibition Era from a minor problem in Italian neighbourhoods to a powerful collection of criminal families in an uneasy empire across America. The return of legal alcohol was a blow to the gangsters and the easy wealth of the era has never yet been matched. However, Mob control of betting rackets, prostitution, narcotics, Union organizations, gambling and extortion survived the 21st Amendment.

Colombia witnessed the same dynamics in organized crime with the rise of the Medellin Cocaine Cartel. From the late 1970s onwards, the cocaine barons slowly ceased their own quarrels and loosely unified. Yet, like the American Mafia, cartel members occasionally fought with each other. From 1984 onwards, the Cartel concentrated on destabilizing Colombian authority so they could protest their own interests. In Canada, the situation in the cigarette industry combines some elements of both the Cartel and Prohibition situations. Various Reserves are now in the hands of an indigenous organized criminal group — the Warrior’s Society. However, other criminal elements, including Bike gangs, Asian Triads and the Mafia, are closing in on some of the more lucrative smuggling sites. The issue is already violent and will likely become worse in 1994.

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John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: mackenzieinstitute@bellnet.ca


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